HP FIPS 140-2 Manual

© 2008 Hewlett-Packard Company
This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety.
HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager
(Hardware P/N AJ087B, Version 1.1; Firmware Version:1.1)
FIPS 140-2
Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Document Version 0.7
December 4, 2008

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Table of Contents
1INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................................5
1.1 PURPOSE.........................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 REFERENCES...................................................................................................................................................5
2HP STORAGEWORKS SECURE KEY MANAGER.....................................................................................6
2.1 OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ....................................................................................................6
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ....................................................................................................................................8
2.4 ROLES,SERVICES,AND AUTHENTICATION ...................................................................................................11
2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role..............................................................................................................................11
2.4.2 User Role.............................................................................................................................................12
2.4.3 HP User Role.......................................................................................................................................13
2.4.4 Cluster Member Role...........................................................................................................................14
2.4.5 Authentication......................................................................................................................................14
2.4.6 Unauthenticated Services ....................................................................................................................15
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................................15
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................................15
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT..........................................................................................................15
2.7.1 Keys and CSPs.....................................................................................................................................15
2.7.2 Key Generation....................................................................................................................................19
2.7.3 Key/CSP Zeroization............................................................................................................................19
2.8 SELF-TESTS ..................................................................................................................................................19
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS.................................................................................................................20
3SECURE OPERATION....................................................................................................................................21
3.1 INITIAL SETUP ..............................................................................................................................................21
3.2 INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION .........................................................................................................21
3.2.1 First-Time Initialization.......................................................................................................................21
3.2.2 FIPS Mode Configuration ...................................................................................................................21
3.3 PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSURANCE ................................................................................................................22
3.4 KEY AND CSP ZEROIZATION........................................................................................................................24
3.5 ERROR STATE...............................................................................................................................................24
ACRONYMS..............................................................................................................................................................25

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Table of Figures
FIGURE 1–DEPLOYMENT ARCHITECTURE OF THE HP STORAGEWORKS SECURE KEY MANAGER ................................6
FIGURE 2–BLOCK DIAGRAM OF SKM...........................................................................................................................7
FIGURE 3–FRONT PANEL LEDS....................................................................................................................................9
FIGURE 4–REAR PANEL COMPONENTS .......................................................................................................................10
FIGURE 5–REAR PANEL LEDS....................................................................................................................................10
FIGURE 6–FIPS COMPLIANCE IN CLI .........................................................................................................................22
FIGURE 7–FIPS COMPLIANCE IN WEB ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE.........................................................................22
FIGURE 8–TAMPER-EVIDENCE LABELS ......................................................................................................................23
FIGURE 9–TAMPER-EVIDENCE LABELS OVER POWER SUPPLIES .................................................................................23

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Table of Tables
TABLE 1–SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION...................................................................................................6
TABLE 2–LOGICAL INTERFACE AND PHYSICAL PORTS MAPPING..................................................................................8
TABLE 3–FRONT PANEL LED DEFINITIONS..................................................................................................................9
TABLE 4–REAR PANEL COMPONENTS DESCRIPTIONS.................................................................................................10
TABLE 5–REAR PANEL LED DEFINITIONS..................................................................................................................11
TABLE 6–CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES ........................................................................................................................11
TABLE 7–USER SERVICES...........................................................................................................................................13
TABLE 8–HP USER SERVICES .....................................................................................................................................13
TABLE 9–CLUSTER MEMBER SERVICES......................................................................................................................14
TABLE 10 –ROLES AND AUTHENTICATIONS ................................................................................................................14
TABLE 11 –LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS,CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS,AND CSPS FOR SSH....................15
TABLE 12 –LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS,CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS,AND CSPS FOR TLS....................16
TABLE 13 –CIPHER SUITES SUPPORTED BY THE MODULE’S TLS IMPLEMENTATION IN FIPS MODE ...........................17
TABLE 14 –OTHER CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS,CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS,AND CSPS...................................17
TABLE 15 –ACRONYMS ...............................................................................................................................................25

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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the HP StorageWorks Secure Key
Manager (SKM) from Hewlett-Packard Company. Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, specifies the U.S. and Canadian Governments’ requirements for
cryptographic modules. The following pages describe how HP’s SKM meets these requirements and how to use the
SKM in a mode of operation compliant with FIPS 140-2. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2
validation of the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager.
More information about FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) is available at the
website of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST):
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
In this document, the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager is referred to as the SKM, the module, or the device.
1.2 References
This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
•The HP website (http://www.hp.com) contains information on the full line of products from HP.
•The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information for
answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.

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2 HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager
2.1 Overview
HP provides a range of security products for banking, the Internet, and enterprise security applications. These
products use encryption technology—often embedded in hardware—to safeguard sensitive data, such as financial
transactions over private and public networks and to offload security processing from the server.
The HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager is a hardened server that provides security policy and key management
services to encrypting client devices and applications. After enrollment, clients, such as storage systems, application
servers and databases, make requests to the SKM for creation and management of cryptographic keys and related
metadata.
Client applications can access the SKM via its Key Management Service (KMS) server. Configuration and
management can be performed via web administration, Secure Shell (SSH), or serial console. Status-monitoring
interfaces include a dedicated FIPS status interface, a health check interface, and Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP).
The deployment architecture of the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager is shown in Figure 1 below.
Web Server Application Server Database Storage System
HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager
Figure 1 – Deployment Architecture of the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager
2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification
The HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager is validated at FIPS 140-2 section levels shown in Table 1 – Security
Level per FIPS 140-2 Section.
Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 3
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self-Tests 2

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Section Section Title Level
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
The block diagram of the module is given in Figure 2 – Block Diagram of SKM. The cryptographic boundary is
clearly shown in the figure.
Figure 2 – Block Diagram of SKM
In the FIPS mode of operation, the module implements the following Approved algorithms:
•Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption and decryption: 128, 192, and 256 bits, in Electronic
Codebook (ECB) and Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) modes (certificate # 653)
•Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) encryption and decryption: 112 and 168 bits, in ECB and CBC
modes (certificate # 604)
•Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (certificate # 847)
•Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) SHA-1 and HMAC SHA-256 (certificate # 470)
•Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) American National Standard Institute (ANSI) X9.31 key generation,
signature generation, and signature verification: 1024 and 2048 bits (certificate # 302)

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•Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) PQG generation, key generation, signature generation, and signature
verification: 1024 bits (certificate # 244)
•ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 with 2-key 3DES Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG)
(certificate # 375)
•Diffie-Hellman key agreement (SP 800-56A, vendor affirmed; key establishment methodology provides 80
bits of encryption strength)
In the FIPS mode of operation, the module implements the following non-approved algorithms:
•A non-approved Random Number Generator (RNG) to seed the ANSI X9.31 DRNG
•The following commercially-available protocols for key establishment:
oTransport Layer Security (TLS) 1.0/ Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 3.1 protocol using RSA 1024 and
2048 bits for key transport. Caveat: The RSA 1024- and 2048-bit key wrapping and key
establishment provide 80 and 112 bits of encryption strength, respectively.
In the non-FIPS mode of operation, the module also implements DES, MD5, RC4, and 512- and 768-bit RSA for
signature generation and verification, and key establishment.
2.3 Module Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 defines four logical interfaces:
•Data Input
•Data Output
•Control Input
•Status Output
The module features the following physical ports and LEDs:
•Serial port (RS232 DB9)
•Ethernet 10/100/1000 RJ-45 ports (Network Interface Card [NIC], quantity: 2)
•Mouse port (PS/2)
•Keyboard port (PS/2)
•Monitor port (VGA DB15)
•Power input (115VAC)
•LEDs (six on the front panel and seven on the rear panel)
The logical interfaces and their physical port mappings are described in Table 2 – Logical Interface and Physical
Ports Mapping.
Table 2 – Logical Interface and Physical Ports Mapping
Logical Interface Physical Ports
Data Input Keyboard, serial, Ethernet
Data Output Monitor, serial, Ethernet
Control Input Keyboard, mouse, serial, Ethernet
Status Output Monitor, serial, Ethernet, LEDs
There are no buttons or ports on the front panel. There are six LEDs on the front panel. See Figure 3 – Front Panel
LEDs.

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Figure 3 – Front Panel LEDs
Descriptions of the LEDs are given in Table 3 – Front Panel LED Definitions.
Table 3 – Front Panel LED Definitions
Item Description Status
1 Power On/Standby button
and system power LED
Green = System is on.
Amber = System is shut down, but power is still applied.
Off = Power cord is not attached, power supply failure has
occurred, no power supplies are installed, facility power is not
available, or disconnected power button cable.
2 Unit Identifier (UID)
button/LED Blue = Identification is activated. Off = Identification is deactivated.
3 Internal health LED
Green = System health is normal.
Amber = System health is degraded. To identify the component in
a degraded state, refer to “HP Systems Insight Display and LEDs”.
Red = System health is critical. To identify the component in a
critical state, refer to “HP Systems Insight Display and LEDs”.
Off = System health is normal (when in standby mode).
4 External health LED (power
supply)
Green = Power supply health is normal.
Amber = Power redundancy failure occurred.
Off = Power supply health is normal when in standby mode.
5 NIC 1 link/activity LED
Green = Network link exists.
Flashing green = Network link and activity exist.
Off = No link to network exists.
If power is off, the front panel LED is not active. View the LEDs on
the RJ-45 connector for status by referring to the rear panel LEDs.
6 NIC 2 link/activity LED
Green = Network link exists.
Flashing green = Network link and activity exist.
Off = No link to network exists.
If power is off, the front panel LED is not active. View the LEDs on
the RJ-45 connector for status by referring to the rear panel LEDs
The components on the rear panel are illustrated in Figure 4 – Rear Panel Components.

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Figure 4 – Rear Panel Components
Descriptions of components on the rear panel are given in Table 4 – Rear Panel Components Descriptions.
Table 4 – Rear Panel Components Descriptions
Item Definition
1 PCI Express expansion slot 1 (Blocked)
2 PCI Express expansion slot 2 (Blocked)
3 Power supply bay 2
4 Power supply bay 1
5 NIC connector 1 (Ethernet)
6 NIC connector 2 (Ethernet)
7 Keyboard connector
8 Mouse connector
9 Video connector
10 Serial connector
11 Universal Serial Bus (USB) connector 1 (Blocked)
12 USB connector 2 (Blocked)
13 Integrated Lights-Out (iLO) 2 NIC connector (Blocked)
The seven LEDs on the rear panel are illustrated in Figure 5 – Rear Panel LEDs.
Figure 5 – Rear Panel LEDs

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Descriptions of LEDs on the rear panel are given in Table 5 – Rear Panel LED Definitions.
Table 5 – Rear Panel LED Definitions
Item Description Status
1 10/100/1000 NIC 1 activity
LED
Green = Activity exists.
Flashing green = Activity exists.
Off = No activity exists.
2 10/100/1000 NIC 1 link
LED Green = Link exists. Off = No link exists.
3 10/100/1000 NIC 2 activity
LED
Green = Activity exists.
Flashing green = Activity exists.
Off = No activity exists.
4 10/100/1000 NIC 2 link
LED Green = Link exists. Off = No link exists.
5 UID LED Blue = Identification is activated.
Off = Identification is deactivated.
6 Power supply 2 LED Green = Normal
Off = System is off or power supply has failed
7 Power supply 1 LED Green = Normal
Off = System is off or power supply has failed
2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The module supports four authorized roles:
•Crypto Officer
•User
•HP User
•Cluster Member
All roles require identity-based authentication.
2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role
The Crypto Officer accesses the module via the Web Management Console and/or the Command Line Interface
(CLI). This role provides all services that are necessary for the secure management of the module. Table 6 shows the
services for the Crypto Officer role under the FIPS mode of operation. The purpose of each service is shown in the
first column (“Service”), and the corresponding function is described in the second column (“Description”). The
keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced
in Section 2.7.1.
Table 6 – Crypto Officer Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate to SKM Authenticate to SKM with a username and
the associated password Crypto Officer passwords – read; TLS/SSH keys – read

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Service Description Keys/CSPs
Perform first-time
initialization Configure the module when it is used for the first time Crypto Officer (admin) password – write;
Kdsa public/private – write;
Krsa private – write;
Krsa private – write;
Log signing RSA key – write;
Log signature verification RSA
key – write;
KRsaPub – write;
KRsaPriv – write.
Upgrade firmware Upgrade firmware (firmware must be FIPS-
validated) Firmware upgrade key – read
Configure FIPS mode Enable/disable FIPS mode None
Manage keys Manage all client keys that are stored within
the module. This includes the generation,
storage, export (only public keys), import, and
zeroization of keys.
Client keys – write, read, delete;
PKEK – write, read, delete.
Manage clusters Manage all clusters that are defined within
the module. This includes the creation,
joining, and removal of a cluster from the
module.
Cluster Member passwords –
write, delete
Manage services Manage all services supported by the
module. This includes the starting and
stopping of all services.
None
Manage operators Create, modify, or delete module operators
(Crypto Officers and Users). Crypto Officer passwords – write, delete; User passwords –
write, delete
Manage certificates Create/import/revoke certificates KRsaPub – write, read, delete;
KRsaPriv – write, read, delete;
CARsaPub – write, read, delete;
CARsaPriv – write, read, delete;
Client RSA public keys – read.
Reset factory settings Rollback to the default firmware shipped with
the module All keys/CSPs – delete
Restore default
configuration Delete the current configuration file and restores the default configuration settings None
Restore configuration
file Restore a previously backed up configuration file None
Backup configuration
file Back up a configuration file None
Zeroize all keys/CSPs Zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module All keys and CSPs – delete
2.4.2 User Role
The User role is associated with external applications or clients that connect to the KMS via its XML interface.
Users in this role may exercise services—such as key generation and management—based on configured or
predefined permissions. See Table 7 – User Services for details. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost column
correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.

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Table 7 – User Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate to SKM Authenticate to SKM with a username and the
associated password User passwords – read
Generate key Generate a cryptographic key Client keys – write;
PKEK – write.
Modify key meta data Change the key owner or update/add/delete
the custom attributes None
Delete key Delete a cryptographic key Client keys – delete;
PKEK – delete.
Query key meta data Output key names and meta data that the
User is allowed to access Client keys – read;
PKEK – read.
Import key Import key Client keys – write;
PKEK – write.
Export key Export a cryptographic key Client keys – read;
PKEK – read.
Export Certificate Export a certificate Client certificate – read
Clone Key Clone an existing key under a different key
name Client keys – write, read;
PKEK – write, read.
Generate random
number Generate a random number ANSI X9.31 DRNG seed – write, read, delete
Manage operators Only users with administration permission can
create, modify, or delete module operators User passwords – write, delete
2.4.3 HP User Role
The HP User role can reset the module to an uninitialized state in the event that all Crypto Officer passwords are
lost, or when a self-test permanently fails. See Table 8 – HP User Services. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost
column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.
Table 8 – HP User Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate to the
module Authenticate to SKM with a signed token HP User RSA public key – read
Reset factory settings Rollback to the default firmware shipped with
the module All keys/CSPs – delete
Restore default
configuration Delete the current configuration file and restores the default configuration settings None

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Service Description Keys/CSPs
Zeroize all keys/CSPs Zeroize all keys/CSPs in the module All keys/CSPs – delete
2.4.4 Cluster Member Role
The Cluster Member role is associated with other SKMs that can connect to this SKM and access cluster services.
See Table 9 – Cluster Member Services. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and
CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.
Table 9 – Cluster Member Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate Cluster
Member Authenticate to SKM via TLS Cluster Member passwords – read; Cluster key – read; Cluster
Member RsaPub – read
Receive Configuration
File Update the module’s configuration settings None
Zeroize Key Delete a specific key Cluster key – delete
Backup Configuration
File Back up a configuration file None
2.4.5 Authentication
The module performs identity-based authentication for the four roles. Two authentication schemes are used:
authentication with certificate in TLS and authentication with password. See Table 10 – Roles and Authentications
for a detailed description.
Table 10 – Roles and Authentications
Role Authentication
Crypto Officer Username and password with optional digital certificate
User Username and password and/or digital certificate
HP User Digital certificate
Cluster Member Digital certificate over TLS
The 1024-bit RSA signature on a digital certificate provides 80-bits of security. There are 280 possibilities. The
probability of a successful random guess is 2-80. Since 10-6 » 2-80, a random attempt is very unlikely to succeed. At
least 80 bits of data must be transmitted for one attempt. (The actual number of bits that need to be transmitted for
one attempt is much greater than 80. We are considering the worst case scenario.) The processor used by the module
has a working frequency of 3.0 gigabytes, hence, at most 60×3.0×109bits of data can be transmitted in 60 seconds.
Since 80 bits are necessary for one attempt, at most (60×3.0×109)/80 = 2.25×109attempts are possible in 60 seconds.
However, there exist 280 possibilities. (2.25×109)/280 = 1.86×10-15 « 10-5. The probability of a successful certificate
attempt in 60 seconds is considerably less than 10-5.
Passwords in the module must consist of eight or more characters from the set of 90 human-readable numeric,
alphabetic (upper and lower case), and special character symbols. Excluding those combinations that do not meet
password constraints (see Section 2.7.1 – Keys and CSPs), the size of the password space is about 608. The
probability of a successful random guess is 60-8. Since 10-6 » 60-8, a random attempt is very unlikely to succeed.
After six unsuccessful attempts, the module will be locked down for 60 seconds; i.e., at most six trials are possible

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in 60 seconds. Since 10-5 » 6×60-8, the probability of a successful password attempt in 60 seconds is considerably
less than 10-5.
2.4.6 Unauthenticated Services
The following services do not require authentication:
•SNMP statistics
•FIPS status services
•Health check services
•Network Time Protocol (NTP) services
•Initiation of self-tests by rebooting the SKM
•Negotiation of the XML protocol version for communications with the KMS
SNMP is used only for sending statistical information (SNMP traps). FIPS status and health check are status-report
services, unrelated to security or cryptography. NTP is a date/time synchronization service that does not involve
keys or CSPs. Initiation of self-tests and negotiation of the XML protocol version do not involve keys or CSPs.
2.5 Physical Security
The module was tested and found conformant to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by Title 47 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (that is, for business
use).
The HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The entire contents of
the module, including all hardware, software, firmware, and data, are enclosed in a metal case. The case is opaque
and must be sealed using tamper-evident labels in order to prevent the case cover from being removed without signs
of tampering. All circuits in the module are coated with commercial standard passivation. Once the module has been
configured to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the module cannot be accessed without signs of tampering.
See Section 3.3 – Physical Security Assurance of this document for more information.
2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment requirements do not apply to the HP StorageWorks Secure Key Manager—the module
does not provide a general purpose operating system and only allows the updating of image components after
checking an RSA signature on the new firmware image. Crypto Officers can install a new firmware image on the
SKM by downloading the image to the SKM. This image is signed by an RSA private key (which never enters the
module). The SKM verifies the signature on the new firmware image using the public key stored in the module. If
the verification passes, the upgrade is allowed. Otherwise the upgrade process fails and the old image is reused.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
2.7.1 Keys and CSPs
The SSH and TLS protocols employed by the FIPS mode of the module are security-related. Table 11 – List of
Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for SSH and Table 12 – List of Cryptographic
Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for TLS, introduce cryptographic keys, key components, and
CSPs involved in the two protocols, respectively.
Table 11 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for SSH
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use

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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
DH
public
param
1024-bit Diffie-
Hellman public
parameters
Generated by ANSI
X9.31 DRNG during
session initialization
In
plaintext In volatile memory Upon session termination Negotiate SSH Ks and SSH
Khmac
DH
private
param
1024-bit Diffie-
Hellman private
parameters
Generated by ANSI
X9.31 DRNG during
session initialization
Never In volatile
memory Upon session termination Negotiate SSH Ks and SSH
Khmac
Kdsa
public 1024-bit DSA public keys Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during
first-time initialization
In
plaintext In non-volatile memory At operator delete or zeroize request Verify the signature of the
server’s
message.
Kdsa
private 1024-bit DSA private keys Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during
first-time initialization
Never In non-volatile
memory At operator delete or zeroize request Sign the server’s
message.
Krsa
public 1024-bit RSA public keys Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during
first-time initialization
In
plaintext In non-volatile memory At operator delete or zeroize request Verify the signature of the
server’s
message.
Krsa
private 1024-bit RSA private keys Generated by ANSI X9.31 DRNG during
first-time initialization
Never In non-volatile
memory At operator delete or zeroize request Sign the server’s
message.
SSH Ks SSH session
168-bit 3DES key,
128-, 192-, 256-bit
AES key
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement Never In volatile memory Upon session termination or
when a new Ks is
generated (after a
certain timeout)
Encrypt and
decrypt data
SSH
Khmac SSH session 512- bit HMAC key Diffie-Hellman key agreement Never In volatile memory Upon session termination or
when a new
Khmac is
generated (after a
certain timeout)
Authenticate
data
Notice that SSH version 2 is explicitly accepted for use in FIPS mode, according to section 7.1 of the NIST FIPS
140-2 Implementation Guidance.
Table 12 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for TLS
Key Key Type Generation /
Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Pre-MS TLS pre-master
secret Input in encrypted form
from client
Never In volatile
memory Upon session termination Derive MS
MS TLS master secret Derived from Pre-
MS using FIPS
Approved key
derivation
function
Never In volatile
memory Upon session termination Derive TLS Ks and TLS
Khmac

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Key Key Type Generation /
Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
KRsaPub Server RSA public
key (1024- or 2048-
bit)
Generated by
ANSI X9.31
DRNG during
first-time
initialization
In plaintext
a X509
certificate.
In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete request Client encrypts Pre-MS. Client
verifies server
signatures
KRsaPriv Server RSA private
key (1024- or 2048-
bit)
Generated by
ANSI X9.31
DRNG during
first-time
initialization
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or
zeroize request
Server
decrypts Pre-
MS. Server
generates
signatures
CARsaPub Certificate Authority
(CA) RSA public key
(1024- or 2048-bit)
Generated by
ANSI X9.31
DRNG during
first-time
initialization
In plaintext In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete request Verify CA signatures
CARsaPriv CA RSA private key
(1024- or 2048-bit) Generated by ANSI X9.31
DRNG during
first-time
initialization
never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or
zeroize request
Sign server
certificates
Cluster
Member
RsaPub
Cluster Member
RSA public key
(1024- or 2048-bit)
Input in plaintext Never In volatile
memory Upon session termination Verify Cluster Member
signatures
TLS Ks TLS session AES or
3DES symmetric
key(s)
Derived from MS Never In volatile
memory Upon session termination Encrypt and decrypt data
TLS Khmac TLS session HMAC
key Derived from MS Never In volatile memory Upon session termination Authenticate data
Table 13 details all cipher suites supported by the TLS protocol implemented by the module. The suite names in the
first column match the definitions in RFC 2246 and RFC 4346.
Table 13 – Cipher Suites Supported by the Module’s TLS Implementation in FIPS Mode
Suite Name Authentication Key
Transport Symmetric Cryptography Hash
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA RSA AES (256-bit) SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RSA RSA AES (128-bit) SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA RSA RSA 3DES (168-bit) SHA-1
Other CSPs are tabulated in Table 14.
Table 14 – Other Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key Key Type Generation /
Input Output Storage Zeroization Use

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Key Key Type Generation /
Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Client AES
key 128, 192 or 256-bit AES
key
Generated by
ANSI X9.31
DRNG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
Encrypted in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or zeroize
request
Encrypt
plaintexts/decrypt
ciphertexts
Client
3DES key 3DES key Generated by ANSI X9.31
DRNG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
Encrypted in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or zeroize
request
Encrypt
plaintexts/decrypt
ciphertexts
Client RSA
public keys RSA public key Generated by ANSI X9.31
DRNG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
Encrypted in
non-volatile
memory
At operator delete Sign
messages/verify
signatures
Client RSA
keys RSA private keys Generated by ANSI X9.31
DRNG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
Encrypted in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or zeroize
request
Sign
messages/verify
signatures
Client
HMAC keys HMAC keys Generated by ANSI X9.31
DRNG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
Encrypted in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or zeroize
request
Compute keyed-
MACs
Client
certificate X.509 certificate Input in ciphertext
over TLS
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
In non-volatile
memory Per client’s request or by
zeroize request
Encrypt
data/verify
signatures
Crypto
Officer
passwords
Character
string Input in plaintext Never In non-volatile memory At operator delete or by zeroize
request
Authenticate
Crypto Officer
User
passwords Character string Input in plaintext Never In non-volatile memory At operator delete or by zeroize
request
Authenticate
User
Cluster
Member
password
Character
string Input in ciphertext
over TLS
Never In non-volatile
memory At operator delete or zeroize request When a device attempts to
become a
Cluster Member
HP User
RSA public
key
2048-bit RSA
public key Input in plaintext at
factory
Never In non-volatile
memory At installation of a patch or new
firmware
Authenticate HP
User
Cluster key Character
string Input in ciphertext
over TLS
Never In non-volatile
memory At operator delete or by zeroize
request
Authenticate
Cluster Member
Firmware
upgrade
key
1024-bit RSA
public key Input in plaintext at
factory
Never In non-volatile
memory When new firmware upgrade
key is input
Used in firmware
upgrade integrity
test

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Key Key Type Generation /
Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Log signing
keys 1024-bit RSA public and
private keys
Generated by
ANSI X9.31
DRNG at first-
time
initialization
Never In non-volatile
memory When new log signing keys are
generated on
demand by
Crypto Officer
Sign logs and
verify signature
on logs
ANSI X9.31
DRNG
seed
DRNG seed Generated by
non-Approved
RNG
Never In non-volatile
memory When module is powered off Initialize ANSI X9.31 DRNG
PKEK 256-bit AES
key Generated by ANSI X9.31
DRNG
In encrypted
form for backup
purposes only
In non-volatile
memory At operator delete or by zeroize
request
Encrypt client
keys
2.7.2 Key Generation
The module uses an ANSI X9.31 DRNG with 2-key 3DES to generate cryptographic keys. This DRNG is a FIPS
140-2 approved DRNG as specified in Annex C to FIPS PUB 140-2.
2.7.3 Key/CSP Zeroization
All ephemeral keys are stored in volatile memory in plaintext. Ephemeral keys are zeroized when they are no longer
used. Other keys and CSPs are stored in non-volatile memory with client keys being stored in encrypted form.
To zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module, the Crypto Officer should execute the reset factory settings
zeroize command at the serial console interface. For security reasons, this command is available only through the
serial console.
2.8 Self-Tests
The device implements two types of self-tests: power-up self-tests and conditional self-tests.
Power-up self-tests include the following tests:
•Firmware integrity tests
•Known Answer Test (KAT) on 3DES
•KAT on AES
•KAT on SHA-1
•KAT on SHA-256
•KAT on SHA-384
•KAT on SHA-512
•KAT on HMAC SHA-1
•KAT on HMAC SHA-256
•KAT on ANSI X9.31 DRNG
•KAT on Diffie-Hellman
•KAT on SSH Key Derivation Function
•KAT on RSA signature generation and verification
•Pairwise consistency test on DSA signature generation and verification
Conditional self-tests include the following tests:

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•Pairwise consistency test for new DSA keys
•Pairwise consistency test for new RSA keys
•Continuous random number generator test on ANSI X9.31 DRNG
•Continuous random number generator test on non-Approved RNG
•Firmware upgrade integrity test
•Diffie-Hellman primitive test
The module has two error states: a Soft Error state and a Fatal Error state. When one or more power-up self-tests
fail, the module may enter either the Fatal Error state or the Soft Error State. When a conditional self-test fails, the
module enters the Soft Error state. See Section 3 of this document for more information.
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. No claim is made that the module mitigates against any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-
2 Level 2 requirements for this validation.