Phoenix Contact PSRclassic Series User manual

User manual
Application manual for PSRclassic and
PSRmultifunction safety relays, and the
modular safety relay system

2019-04-04
PHOENIX CONTACT GmbH & Co. KG • Flachsmarktstraße 8 • 32825 Blomberg • Germany
phoenixcontact.com
102597_en_03
Application manual for PSRclassic and PSRmultifunction safety
relays, and the modular safety relay system
Phoenix Contact PSRclassic and PSRmultifunction safety relays, and the modular safety relay system
User manual
This user manual is valid for:
UM EN SAFETY RELAY APPLICATION, Revision 03

102597_en_03 PHOENIX CONTACT 3 / 136
Table of contents
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................7
1.1 Target group for this application manual................................................................7
1.2 Symbols used........................................................................................................8
1.3 Further documentation ..........................................................................................8
2 Safety of machines and systems ...............................................................................................9
2.1 Functional safety .................................................................................................10
2.2 Practical procedure in accordance with EN ISO 13849 .......................................10
2.2.1 Definition of the safety function ............................................................10
2.2.2 Determination of the required performance level (PLr) .........................11
2.2.3 Technical implementation ....................................................................11
2.2.4 Determination of the achieved PL for each subsystem .........................12
2.2.5 Determination of the achieved PL for the overall safety function ..........14
2.2.6 Verification of the achieved PL .............................................................14
2.2.7 Validation .............................................................................................14
2.3 Practical procedure in accordance with EN ISO 62061 .......................................15
2.3.1 Specification of requirements for the safety-related control function
(SRCF) .................................................................................................15
2.3.2 Determination of the required safety integrity level (SIL) ......................15
2.3.3 Drafting the safety-related electrical control system (SRECS) .............15
2.3.4 Dividing the safety function into subsystems ........................................16
2.3.5 Determination of the achieved safety integrity for the entire SRECS ....18
2.3.6 Verification of the achieved SIL ............................................................18
2.3.7 Validation .............................................................................................19
3 Safety technology basics .........................................................................................................21
3.1 Cross-circuit detection.........................................................................................21
3.2 Maximum cable lengths.......................................................................................22
3.3 Stop.....................................................................................................................24
3.4 Safe isolation .......................................................................................................26
4 Overview of safe switching devices .........................................................................................27
4.1 Conventional safety relays PSRclassic................................................................27
4.2 Multifunctional safety relays PSRmultifunction ....................................................29
4.3 Modular safety relay system ................................................................................30

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5 Application examples for conventional PSRclassic safety relays .............................................31
5.1 Emergency stop...................................................................................................31
5.1.1 PSR-ESL4/3x1/1x2/B up to PL c/SIL 1 .................................................32
5.1.2 PSR-ESD/4x1/30 up to PL c/SIL 1 .......................................................34
5.1.3 PSR-ESAM4/2x1/1x2 up to PL e/SIL 3 .................................................36
5.1.4 PSR-ESL4/3x1/1x2/B up to PL d/SIL 2 .................................................38
5.1.5 PSR-ESAM4/8x1/1x2 up to PL e/SIL 3 .................................................40
5.1.6 PSR-ESD/4x1/30 up to PL e/SIL 3 .......................................................42
5.1.7 PSR-ESAM4/3x1/1x2/B up to PL e/SIL 3 .............................................44
5.2 Light grids (ESPE)/laser scanners (AOPD)..........................................................47
5.2.1 PSR-ESL4/3x1/1x2/B up to PL e/SIL 3 .................................................48
5.2.2 PSR-ESD/4x1/30 up to PL e/SIL 3 .......................................................50
5.2.3 PSR-ESAM4/8x1/1x2 up to PL e/SIL 3 .................................................52
5.2.4 PSR-ESD/4x1/30 up to PL d/SIL 2 .......................................................54
5.3 Movable guards...................................................................................................57
5.3.1 PSR-ESA4/2x1/1x2 up to PL e/SIL 3 ....................................................58
5.3.2 PSR-ESAM4/2x1/1x2 up to PL e/SIL 3 .................................................60
5.3.3 PSR-ESAM4/3x1/1x2 up to PL e/SIL 3 .................................................62
5.3.4 PSR-ESAM4/3x1/1x2/B up to PL d/SIL 2 .............................................64
5.3.5 PSR-ESD/4x1/30 up to PL c/SIL 1 .......................................................66
5.3.6 PSR-ESD/4x1/30 up to PL e/SIL 3 .......................................................68
5.3.7 PSR-ESD/5x1/1x2/300 up to PL e/SIL 3 ..............................................70
5.3.8 PSR-ESL4/3x1/1x2/B up to PL d/SIL 2 .................................................72
5.4 Enable switch ......................................................................................................75
5.4.1 PSR-ESAM4/2x1/1x2 up to PL e/SIL 3 .................................................76
5.4.2 PSR-ESAM4/3x1/1x2/B up to PL e/SIL 3 .............................................78
5.4.3 PSR-ESAM4/2x1/1x2 up to PL e/SIL 3 .................................................80
5.5 Two-hand control.................................................................................................83
5.5.1 PSR-THC4/2x1/1x2 up to PL e/SIL 3 ...................................................84
5.6 Contact extension/force-guided contacts ............................................................87
5.6.1 PSR-URM4/5x1/2x2 up to PL e/SIL 3 ..................................................88
5.6.2 PSR-URM4/4NO/2NC up to PL e/SIL 3 ...............................................90
5.6.3 PSR-URML4/3x1/1x2/B up to PL e/SIL 3 .............................................92
6 Application examples for multifunctional PSRmultifunction safety relays .................................95
6.1 Multifunctional safety applications with emergency stop,
safety doors, and light grids.................................................................................96
6.1.1 PSR-MXF1/4X1/2X2/B up to PL e/SIL 3 ...............................................96
6.1.2 PSR-MXF2/4X1/2X2/B up to PL e/SIL 3 ...............................................99
6.1.3 PSR-MXF3/4X1/2X2/B up to PL e/SIL 3 .............................................102
6.1.4 PSR-MXF4/4X1/2X2/B up to PL e/SIL 3 .............................................105

Table of contents
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7 Application examples using the modular safety relay system ................................................109
7.1 PSR-SDC4/2x1/B master module......................................................................109
7.1.1 PSR-SDC4/2x1/B up to PL e/SIL 3 .....................................................110
7.1.2 PSR-SDC4/2x1/B up to PL e/SIL 3 .....................................................112
7.1.3 PSR-SDC4/2x1/B up to PL e/SIL 3 .....................................................114
7.2 Contact extension/force-guided contacts ..........................................................117
7.2.1 PSR-URM4/4x1/2x2/B up to PL e/SIL 3 .............................................118
8 Diagnostic description ............................................................................................................121
A Appendix ................................................................................................................................133
A 1 Explanation of terms ..........................................................................................133

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Introduction
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1 Introduction
The term “safety” derives from Latin and refers to a state that is free from unacceptable risks.
This fundamental human requirement is also enshrined in basic EU law.
The safety of machines and systems mainly depends on the correct application of standards
and directives. In Europe, the basis for this is the Machinery Directive, which provides stan-
dard specifications to support companies when designing safety-related machines. The aim
is to eliminate barriers to trade within the EU. However, even outside the European Eco-
nomic Area, many European standards are gaining in importance due to their international
status.
The fact that the safety of machines and systems not only depends on the components and
technologies used, but is mainly affected by the “human” factor is no surprise.
However, the most important aspect is the way in which this fact is dealt with. The main focus
should not only be the safety products – with their benefits and their functions – but also easy
handling and associated services. The user expects considerably more support in these
areas. With the slogan “simplicity in safety”, Phoenix Contact has integrated easy planning,
installation, and operation of safety machines or systems and support over their entire life-
cycle into its safety concept. Safety does not have to be complicated or involve a great deal
of additional effort. Benefit from our expertise and experience as manufacturers of safety-
related components by using products with complete application examples and access our
qualified service package in all phases of the safety lifecycle.
1.1 Target group for this application manual
This manual is aimed at all designers of safety control systems. This manual should provide
a simple introduction to the technology of safety-related machines and systems and an over-
view of safety technology basics. You must always ensure you are familiar with the direc-
tives, standards, and regulations relevant to the field of application.

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1.2 Symbols used
1.3 Further documentation
For product information and safety technology characteristics of the PSR safety relays from
Phoenix Contact, please refer to the relevant product data sheets, the
AH EN SAFETY CHARACTERISTICS application note, or the SISTEMA library.
The documentation can be downloaded under the corresponding product at
phoenixcontact.net/products.
Emergency stop
Movable safety equipment
AOPD light grid
Magnetic switch
AOPDDR laser scanner
Two-hand control device
Enable switch
Observe the product documentation valid for the devices you are using. Make sure you
always use the latest documentation.

Safety of machines and systems
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2 Safety of machines and systems
In modern industrial production, the amount of complex technical equipment used is con-
stantly increasing. The purpose of safety technology is to reduce the safety risk to persons,
livestock, the environment, and machines as far as possible but at least to a reasonable
degree. At the same time, the availability of production equipment should not be restricted
any more than is absolutely necessary.
Safety is relative. There can never be a completely safe machine. However, since the open-
ing of the European single market, manufacturers and operators of machines and technical
equipment are legally bound to observe European directives for the design and operation
of machines and systems.
When adhering to harmonized standards (assumed effect), which apply to a machine or
piece of technical equipment, it is assumed that they comply with legal regulations when
launched.
The Machinery Directive is one of the most important single market directives. It is of such
importance because machine building is one of the industrial mainstays of the European
Economic Area. The Machinery Directive defines the requirements machinery must meet
before it can be placed on the market and operated in the European Economic Area. It also
contains essential health and safety requirements for the planning and construction of
machinery and safety components.
Every machine or system poses a risk. According to the requirements of the Machinery
Directive, a risk assessment must be carried out for every machine.
If the risk is greater than the level of risk that can be tolerated, risk reduction must be imple-
mented.
Standard EN ISO 12100 “Safety of machinery – General principles for design – Risk assess-
ment and risk reduction” describes the risks to be considered and the general principles for
design to reduce risk. It also describes risk assessment and risk reduction as a repetitive
process to achieve safety. All phases in the life of the machine are therefore assessed.
Figure 2-1 Risk reduction in machines
Design-related
measures
Protective measures Has everything
been done?
How to proceed
Risk
Organization
Has everything
been done?

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2.1 Functional safety
Safety-related parts of machine control systems are frequently assigned to provide safety
functions. The contribution to risk reduction of machinery by the safety-related parts of a
control system (SRP/CS) is determined in accordance with EN ISO 12100.
In order to achieve the necessary functional safety of a machine or system, it is essential for
the safety-related parts of the safety equipment and control devices to operate correctly
and, in the event of failure, for the system to remain in the safe state or enter a safe state.
The requirements for achieving functional safety are based on the following basic objec-
tives:
– Avoiding systematic errors
– Controlling systematic errors
– Controlling random errors or failures
The requirements of the safety-related parts of a machine control system are specified in
EN ISO 13849 (and EN 62061). The standard specifies the various safety levels in the form
of the “performance level” (PL) (and “safety integrity level” (SIL)) for the safety-related parts
according to the degree of risk and describes the characteristics of the safety functions.
2.2 Practical procedure in accordance with
EN ISO 13849
In practice, the following steps have proven effective when designing safe control systems
in accordance with EN ISO 13849.
2.2.1 Definition of the safety function
The safety functions must be defined first. This information is derived from the risk assess-
ment.
Example:
Trigger event: Opening the safety door.
Response: The robot drive is set to a safe stop state. The power semicon-
ductor pulses are disabled.
Safe state: Power circuit has no power.

Safety of machines and systems
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2.2.2 Determination of the required performance level (PLr)
The PLris determined in combination with the safety function within the framework of the
higher-level risk assessment. For each safety function, the required PLris estimated using
the risk graph below.
Figure 2-2 Risk graph (in accordance with EN 13849-1)
Meaning of individual parameters:
2.2.3 Technical implementation
This step involves the technical pre-planning of the safety function, taking possible technol-
ogies and components into account. The safety-related components and parts must then
be identified for later verification.
Dividing the safety function into subsystems
In the next step, a safety-related block diagram must be created for further evaluation. As a
rule, a safety function consists of sensor - logic - actuator. In the simplest case, each one is
a subsystem. These subsystems are connected in series to form the overall safety function.
S: Severity of injury
S1 Slight (normally reversible) injury
S2 Serious (normally irreversible) injury
F: Frequency and duration of exposure to the hazard
F1 Seldom to not very frequent or exposure to hazard is brief
F2 Frequent to continuous or exposure to hazard is long
P: Possibility of avoiding or limiting damage
P1 Possible under specific conditions
P2 Scarcely possible
P1
P2
P1
P2
P1
P2
P1
P2
F1
F2
F1
F2
S1
S2
a
b
c
d
e
Low risk
High risk
Start
Required
performance level

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Figure 2-3 Safety-related block diagram (in accordance with EN 13849-1)
2.2.4 Determination of the achieved PL for each subsystem
A characteristic value when determining the performance level is the PFHDvalue, the sta-
tistical “average frequency of a dangerous failure per hour”. The safety characteristics can
be found in the DB EN SAFETY CHARACTERISTICS data sheet or the SISTEMA library.
The diagram below shows the basic relationship between PL and the safety characteristics
category, DC, and MTTFD.
Figure 2-4 Relationship between PL, category, DC, and MTTFD(in accordance with
EN 13849-1)
The category is an important parameter when determining the PL. The category term has
been taken from the previous standard EN 954-1. The requirements for the categories are
listed below.
L
IO
I
m
I
m
a
b
c
d
e
Kat. B Kat. 1 Kat. 2 Kat. 2 Kat. 3 Kat. 3 Kat. 4
MTTF
d
MTTF
d
MTTF
d
10
-5
10
-6
10
-7
10
-8
PFH
D
Dc
avg
Dc
avg
Dc
avg
Dc
avg
Dc
avg
Dc
avg
Dc
avg
None None Low Medium Low Medium High
Low
Medium
High

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Table 2-1 Explanation of categories
Category Summary of requirements System behavior Principle to achieve safety
B Safety-related parts of control systems
and/or their protective equipment, as well
as their components, shall be designed,
constructed, selected, assembled, and
combined in accordance with relevant stan-
dards so that they can withstand the
expected influences. Basic safety princi-
ples must be used.
Occurrence of a fault can lead
to the loss of the safety func-
tion.
Mainly characterized by the
selection of components.
1 The requirements of category B must be
met. Proven components and proven safety
principles must be used.
Occurrence of a fault can lead
to the loss of the safety func-
tion but the probability of
occurrence is lower than in
category B.
Mainly characterized by the
selection of components.
2 The requirements of category B and the use
of proven safety principles must be met.
The safety function must be tested by the
machine control system at suitable inter-
vals.
The occurrence of a fault can
lead to the loss of the safety
function between the tests.
The loss of the safety function
is detected by the test.
Mainly characterized by the
structure.
3 The requirements of category B and the use
of proven safety principles must be met.
Safety-related parts must be designed so
that:
– A single fault in any of these parts does
not lead to the loss of the safety func-
tion
and
– The single fault is detected, whenever
this is feasibly possible
When a single fault occurs,
the safety function is always
performed. Some faults but
not all faults are detected. An
accumulation of undetected
faults can lead to the loss of
the safety function.
Mainly characterized by the
structure.
4 The requirements of category B and the use
of proven safety principles must be met.
Safety-related parts must be designed so
that:
– A single fault in any of these parts does
not lead to the loss of the safety func-
tion
and
– The single fault is detected on or before
the next demand of the safety function
If detection is not possible, an accumu-
lation of undetected faults must not
lead to the loss of the safety function.
When a single fault occurs,
the safety function is always
performed. The detection of
accumulated faults reduces
the probability of the loss of
the safety function (high DC).
The faults are detected in time
to prevent a loss of the safety
function.
Mainly characterized by the
structure.

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2.2.5 Determination of the achieved PL for the overall safety
function
For subsystems with integrated diagnostic functions such as safety relay modules and
safety control systems, the achieved PFHDand PL are provided by the manufacturer with
the specification of the category.
For subsystems consisting of discrete components (e.g., switches, contactors, valves, etc.),
the PFHDvalue is determined from the category, DC, and MTTFD. For components that are
subject to wear, the MTTFDis determined based on the number of operating cycles using
the B10Dvalue provided by the component manufacturer.
In addition, for category 2 or higher the effect of common cause failure (CCF) must also be
considered.
2.2.6 Verification of the achieved PL
Each individual subsystem and the entire safety chain must both meet the requirements of
the necessary PLr. This includes both the quantitative evaluation and the consideration of
systematic aspects, such as proven components and safety principles.
The systematic aspects include:
– Correct dimensioning of components
– Consideration of expected operating conditions and ambient conditions
– Use of basic and proven safety principles
– Avoidance of specification errors and software errors through testing
2.2.7 Validation
The last step should check whether the selected measures achieve the necessary risk
reduction and therefore, the protection objectives of the risk assessment. The result of the
validation process is included in the final risk assessment.
The purpose of the validation process is to confirm the specification and level of conformity
of the design of safety-related parts of the control system (SRP/CS) within the overall spec-
ifications for the safety requirements of the machinery. Before validation of the design of the
SRP/CS or the combination of SRP/CS that contains the safety function, the specification
requirement for the safety function must be confirmed. Validation involves performing anal-
ysis and function tests under normal conditions in accordance with the validation plan.
EN ISO 13849-2 contains detailed requirements and describes the basic procedure for the
individual validation processes.

Safety of machines and systems
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2.3 Practical procedure in accordance with
EN ISO 62061
In practice, the following steps have proven effective when designing safe control systems
according to EN 62061.
2.3.1 Specification of requirements for the safety-related control
function (SRCF)
The safety function must be defined first. This information is derived from the risk assess-
ment.
Example:
2.3.2 Determination of the required safety integrity level (SIL)
The required SIL is determined in combination with the safety function within the framework
of the higher-level risk assessment.
Figure 2-5 Example of specifying the SIL (in accordance with EN 62061)
2.3.3 Drafting the safety-related electrical control system
(SRECS)
This step involves the technical pre-planning of the safety function, taking possible technol-
ogies and components into account. The safety-related components and parts must then
be identified for later verification.
Trigger event: Opening the safety door.
Response: The robot drive is set to a safe stop state. The power semicon-
ductor pulses are disabled.
Safe state: Power circuit has no power.
>
>
>
>
55
54
444
333
222
++
3
4
2
1
SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 3
SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
SIL 1 SIL 3
SIL 1
S3-4 5-7 8-10 11 - 13 14 - 15
Death, loss of an eye
or arm
Permanent, loss of a
finger
Reversible, medical
treatment
Reversible, first aid
Effect Severe Class Class Class Class Class
Other measures
F Frequency and duration F Probability of a
dangerous event
P Avoidance
Impossible
Possible
Probability
Frequent
Probable
Possible
Rare
Negligible
1 hour
1 hour to
Day to
2 weeks to
1 year
1 day
2 weeks
1 year

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2.3.4 Dividing the safety function into subsystems
Following technical implementation and identification of safety-related components, a
safety-related block diagram must be created for further evaluation. As a rule, a safety func-
tion consists of sensor - logic - actuator. In the simplest case, each one is a subsystem.
These subsystems are connected in series to form the overall safety function (see “Safety-
related block diagram (in accordance with EN 13849-1)” on page 12).
Determination of the safety integrity for each subsystem
A characteristic value when determining the safety integrity level (SIL) is the PFHDvalue,
the statistical “average frequency of a dangerous failure per hour”.
The safety characteristics for Phoenix Contact products can be found in the
DB EN SAFETY CHARACTERISTICS data sheet or the SISTEMA library.
Standard EN 62061 describes the subsystem architectures type A to D, which are similar to
the categories of EN ISO 13849-1.
Figure 2-6 Logical representation of subsystem A (in accordance with EN 62061)
Figure 2-7 Logical representation of subsystem B (in accordance with EN 62061)
λ
Den
λ
De1
Subsystem A
Subsystem
Element n
Subsystem
Element 1
λ
De1
λ
De1
λ
De1
λ
De2
Subsystem B
Subsystem
Element 1
Subsystem
Element 2
Common
cause
failure

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Figure 2-8 Logical representation of subsystem C (in accordance with EN 62061)
Figure 2-9 Logical representation of subsystem D (in accordance with EN 62061)
For subsystems with integrated diagnostic functions such as safety relay modules and
safety control systems, the achieved PFHDand SILCL are provided by the manufacturer.
For subsystems consisting of discrete components (e.g., switches, contactors, etc.), the
PFHDvalue is calculated according to the subsystem type using a specific equation (see
Section 6.7.8.2 of EN 62061). For components that are subject to wear, the failure rate is
determined based on the number of operating cycles using the B10Dvalue provided by the
component manufacturer.
λ
Den
λ
De1
Subsystem C
Subsystem
Element n
Subsystem
Element 1
Diagnostic function(s)
λ
De1
λ
De1
λ
De1
λ
De2
Subsystem
Element 1
Diagnostic function(s)
Subsystem
Element 2
Common
cause
failure
Subsystem D

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2.3.5 Determination of the achieved safety integrity for the entire
SRECS
To determine the achieved safety integrity level, the PFHDvalues of the individual subsys-
tems must now be added together. The result must lie within the SIL required for the safety
function.
Furthermore, the SILCL of an individual subsystem determines the maximum achievable
SIL for the SRECS. For safety components with integrated diagnostics, this is provided by
the manufacturer. For subsystems consisting of discrete components, this value must be
determined using the table below.
1) A hardware fault tolerance of N means that N + 1 faults can lead to a loss of the SRCF.
2) See EN 62061, Section 6.7.7.
2.3.6 Verification of the achieved SIL
Each individual subsystem and the entire safety chain must both meet the requirements of
the necessary SIL. This includes both the quantitative evaluation and the consideration of
systematic aspects.
The systematic aspects include:
– Correct dimensioning of components
– Consideration of expected operating conditions and ambient conditions
– Use of basic and proven safety principles
– Avoidance of specification errors and software errors through testing
Table 2-2 Determination of the safety integrity level (in accordance with EN 62061)
Safety integrity
level
Average frequency of a dangerous failure per hour (PFHD)
3≥10-8 to <10-7
2≥10-7 to <10-6
1≥10-6 to <10-5
Table 2-3 Determination of the safety integrity level for a subsystem with discrete com-
ponents (in accordance with EN 62061)
Safe failure fraction Hardware fault tolerance 1)
0 1 2
<60% Not permitted 2) SIL 1 SIL 2
60% to <90% SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
90% to <99% SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 3
≥99% SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL 3

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2.3.7 Validation
The last step should check whether the selected measures achieve the necessary risk
reduction and therefore, the protection objectives.
The result of the validation process is included in the final risk assessment.
The purpose of the validation process is to confirm the specification and level of conformity
of the design of safety-related parts of the control system (SRP/CS) within the overall spec-
ifications for the safety requirements of the machinery. Before validation of the design of the
SRP/CS or the combination of SRP/CS that contains the safety function, the specification
requirement for the safety function must be confirmed. Validation involves performing anal-
ysis and function tests under normal conditions in accordance with the validation plan.
EN ISO 13849-2 contains detailed requirements and describes the basic procedure for the
individual validation processes.

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