Nortel 4600 User manual

© Copyright 2001 Nortel Networks.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Contivity™ Extranet Switch 4600
FIPS 140-1 Non-Proprietary
Cryptographic Module Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
June 2001

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Table of Contents
1Introduction .............................................................................................................. 3
1.1 Purpose................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 References............................................................................................................ 3
1.3 Document Organization....................................................................................... 3
2The Contivity Extranet 4600 Switch....................................................................... 5
2.1 Cryptographic Module......................................................................................... 5
2.2 Module Interfaces ................................................................................................ 5
2.3 Physical Security.................................................................................................. 7
2.4 Roles and Services............................................................................................. 10
2.4.1 Crypto Officer Services............................................................................... 11
2.4.2 User Services............................................................................................... 12
2.5 Key Management............................................................................................... 13
2.6 Self-tests............................................................................................................. 14
3Secure Operation of the Contivity Switch............................................................ 15

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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary cryptographic module security policy for the Contivity™
Extranet Switch 4600. This security policy describes how the Contivity™ Extranet
Switch 4600 meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-1, and how to operate the
Contivity™ Extranet Switch 4600 in a secure FIPS 140-1 compliant mode of operation.
This policy was prepared as part of the FIPS 140-1 Level 2 multi-chip stand alone
certification of the Contivity™ Extranet Switch 4600.
FIPS 140-1 (“Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-1 -- Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules”) details the U.S. Government requirements
for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-1 standard and
validation program is available on the NIST web site at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Contivity™ Extranet
Switch 4600 in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-1 cryptographic module security policy.
More information is available on the Contivity™ Extranet Switch 4600 and the entire line
of Contivity™ products from the following sources:
• The Nortel Networks web site contains information on the full line of
Contivity products at www.nortelnetworks.com.
• For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts
listed on the Nortel Networks web site at www.nortelnetworks.com.
1.3 Document Organization
This document is part of the complete FIPS 140-1 submission package. In addition to this
document, the complete submission package contains the following:
♦ Vendor evidence document
♦ Finite state machine
♦ Source code listing
♦ Other supporting documentation
This document provides an overview of the Contivity™ Switch and explains the secure
configuration and operation of the module. Section 1 provides introductory material,
section 2 details the general features and functionality of the Contivity™ Switch and
section 3 addresses configuration of the switch for FIPS-compliant mode of operation,
henceforth referred to as FIPS mode.
Corsec Security, Inc. produced this security policy and other certification submission
documentation under contract to Nortel Networks. With the exception of this non-

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proprietary security policy, the FIPS 140-1 certification submission documentation is
Nortel-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements.
Please contact Nortel Networks for access to these documents.

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2 The Contivity Extranet 4600 Switch
The Nortel Networks Contivity Extranet Switch 4600 (referred to as the module, or
Switch in this document) provides a scalable, secure, manageable remote access server
that meets FIPS 140-1 level 2 requirements for a multiple-chip standalone module. The
following sections describe how the Switch addresses FIPS 140-1 requirements.
2.1 Cryptographic Module
The Contivity Extranet Switch combines remote access protocols, security,
authentication, authorization, and encryption technologies in a single solution.
Figure 1 – The Contivity Extranet 4600 Switch
The Switch can support up to 5000 simultaneous user sessions, allowing each user to
exercise a variety of secure services. The Switch supports a number of secure network-
layer and data-link-layer protocols including Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), Point-to-
Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP), and Layer Two
Forwarding (L2F). The architecture for the Switch is user-centric, where an individual
user or group of users can be associated with a set of attributes that provide custom access
to the Extranet. In effect, you can create a personalized extranet based on the specific
needs of a user or group. The unique Quality of Service (QoS) features include call
administration and packet forwarding priorities, and support for Resource ReSerVation
Protocol (RSVP).
2.2 Module Interfaces
The interfaces for the Switch are located on the rear panel as shown in Figure 2.

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Figure 2 – Physical Interfaces
The physical interfaces include a power plug, power and reset switches, a serial port, a
LAN Port RJ-45 connector and up to two additional network connectors. Each RJ-45
connector is accompanied by light emitting diodes (LEDs). The LAN Port LEDs, with
the green LED indicating 100Mbps activity and the orange LED indicating link status and
activity, are located on the back panel of the module. More information on the LEDs and
the LAN Port interface can be found in Getting Started with the Contivity Extranet Switch
4600.
The physical interfaces, the LAN port, the 10/100Base-TX ports, serials port and status
LEDs, map to the logical interfaces defined in FIPS 140-1 as described in Table 1.
Switch physical interface
FIPS 140-1 Logical Interface
10/100BASE-TX LAN Ports,
LAN Port Data Input Interface
10/100BASE-TX LAN Ports,
LAN Port Data Output Interface
Power Switch,
Reset Switch,
Serial Port,
LAN Port
Control Input Interface
LAN Port LEDs,
10/100BASE-TX LAN Port LEDs
Serial Port
Status Output Interface
Power Plug Power Interface
Table 1 – FIPS 140-1 Logical Interfaces

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2.3 Physical Security
A thick steel case protects the Contivity™ Extranet Switch 4600. The switch meets FCC
requirements in 47 CFR Part 15 for personal computers and peripherals designated for
home use (ClassB). The case has two removable portions: the front bezel and the top
cover. Removing the front bezel allows access to the floppy drive. The following
diagram shows how to remove the front bezel.
Note: The steps required to remove the front bezel are the same whether or not the Switch
is rack mounted.
Figure 3 - Removing the front bezel

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Figure 4 – Front view without front bezel
Once the Extranet Switch has been configured in its FIPS 140-1 level 2 mode, the cover
may not be removed without signs of tampering. To seal the cover, apply three serialized
tamper-evident labels as follows:
1. Clean the cover of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper-evident labels.
Alcohol based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. The temperature of
the switch should be above 10°C.
2. Apply two (2) labels on the top cover overlapping the side and the rear of the chassis
as shown in Figure 5.
3. Apply two (2) labels on the top and bottom overlapping the front bezel as shown in
Figure 5.
4. Apply one (1) label over the keyboard button cover as shown in Figure 5.
5. Record the serial numbers of the labels applied to the module.
6. Allow 24 hours for the adhesive in the tamper-evident seals to completely cure.

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Figure 5 – Tamper-Evident Labels Applied to Switch
The tamper-evident seals are produced from a special thin gauge white vinyl with self-
adhesive backing. Any attempt to open the switch will damage or destroy the tamper-
evident seals or the painted surface and metal of the module cover. Since the tamper-
evident labels have non-repeated serial numbers, the labels may be inspected for damage
and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that the module has not been
tampered. An intact label is shown in Figure 6, with a visible serial number and no
breaks.
FIPS 140-1 Level 2 Tamper Evident Label
A567422
Contivity Extranet Switch
Figure 6 – Tamper-Evident Label
Attempting to remove a label breaks it or continually tears off small fragments as
depicted in Figure 7. Other signs of tamper-evidence include a strong smell of organic
solvents, warped or bent cover metal, and scratches in the paint on the module.
FIPS 140-1 Level 2 Tamper Evident Label
A567422
Contivity Extranet Switch
Figure 7 – Damaged Tamper-Evident Label

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2.4 Roles and Services
The switch supports up to 5000 simultaneous user sessions using Internet Protocol
Security (IPSec), Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), Layer Two Tunneling
Protocol (L2TP), and Layer Two Forwarding (L2F). In addition, an administrator may
securely configure the switch either locally or remotely. Remote administration is secured
by one of the secure tunneling protocols supported by the box. The administrator selects
which protocols are used from the Services-Available menu.
The Switch employs role-based authentication of users, and stores user identity
information in an internal Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) database.
Authentication can optionally be performed against a variety of external servers using
LDAP or RADIUS, including Novell NDS, Microsoft Windows NT Domains, Security
Dynamics ACE Server, and Axent OmniGuard Defender.
Service Crypto Officer User
Configure the Switch 
Create User Groups 
Create Users 
Modify User Groups 
Modify Users 
Delete User Groups 
Delete Users 
Define Rules and Filters 
Status Functions 
Manage the Switch 
Encrypted Traffic 
Change Password 
Table 2 – Matrix of Services
Users may assume one of two roles: Crypto Officer role or User role. An administrator of
the switch assumes the Crypto Officer role to configure and maintain the switch. The
Crypto Officer role may have the following rights:
• Switch management rights: (none, view switch, or manage switch). View
switch permits an administrator to view all the configuration and status
information on the switch. Manage switch permits an administrator to
configure the switch and change critical settings.
• User management rights: (none, view users, or manage users). View users
permits an administrator to review all user accounts and settings on the switch.
Manage users rights allows an administrator to create, modify, and delete
users.
A User authenticates and assumes the User role to access the following services:

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• IPSec Protocol Tunnels
• PPTP Protocol Tunnels
• L2TP Protocol Tunnels
• L2F Protocol Tunnels
• Change Password
2.4.1 Crypto Officer Services
There is a factory default login ID and password, which allows access to the Crypto
Officer role. This initial account is the primary administrator's account for the Switch,
and guarantees that at least one account is able to assume the Crypto Officer role and
completely manage the switch and users. The switch can also be configured to
authenticate based on RSA digital signatures. An administrator of the switch may assign
permission to access the Crypto Officer role to additional accounts, thereby creating
additional administrators. Each administrator would have a separate ID and password.
Administrators may always access the switch and authenticate themselves via the serial
port. They may also authenticate as a User over a secure tunnel and then authenticate to
the switch as a Crypto Officer in order to manage the switch. An administrator can also
configure the switch to allow or disallow management via a private LAN interface,
without using a secure tunnel. Initially the default configuration allows HTTP
management on the private LAN interface of the Switch without requiring a secure
tunnel.
At the highest level, Crypto Officer services include the following:
• Configure the Switch: to define network interfaces and settings, set the
protocols the switch will support, define routing tables, set system date and
time, load authentication information, etc.
• Create User Groups: to define common sets of user permissions such as
access hours, user priority, password restrictions, protocols allowed, filters
applied, and types of encryption allowed. Administrators can create, edit and
delete User Groups, which effectively defines the permission sets for a
number of Users.
• Create Users: to define User accounts and assign them permissions using
User Groups. Every User may be assigned a separate ID and password for
IPSec, PPTP, L2TP, and L2F, which allow access to the User roles.
Additionally, an account may be assigned an Administration ID, allowing
access to the Crypto Officer role. Each Administrator ID is assigned rights to
Manage the Switch (either none, view switch, or manage switch) and rights to
Manage Users (either none, view users, or manage users).
• Define Rules and Filters: to create packet Filters that are applied to User
data streams on each interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, which
define a set of packets to permit or deny based on characteristics such as
protocol ID, addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or packet

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direction. The administrator may use any of the pre-defined Rules or create
custom Rules to be included in each Filter.
• Status Functions: to view the switch configuration, routing tables, active
sessions, use Gets to view Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
Management Information Base (MIB) II statistics, usage graphs, health,
temperature, memory status, voltage, packet statistics, and review accounting
logs.
• Manage the Switch: to log off users, shut down or reset the switch, disable
or enable audible alarms, manually back up switch configurations, restore
switch configurations, create a recovery diskette, etc.
A complete description of all the management and configuration capabilities of the
Contivity Extranet switch can be found in the Contivity Extranet Switch Administrator’s
Guide and in the online help for the switch.
2.4.2 User Services
An administrator (who has manage users rights) assigns each User a name and a User
Group. The User Group defines access limitations and services that the User may
exercise, including access hours, call admission priority, forwarding priority, number of
simultaneous logins, maximum password age, minimum password length, whether
passwords may contain only alphabetic characters, whether static Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses are assigned, idle timeout, forced logoff for timeout, filters, whether
Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX) is allowed.
The administrator also assigns each User separate User IDs and passwords for the
following services: IPSec, PPTP, L2TP, and L2F tunnels. (A fifth ID and password may
be assigned for Administration of the switch as described in 2.4.1.) The User may then
authenticate as necessary to initiate secure tunnels using any of these services.
• IPSec: Requires authentication through User Name and Password
(checked against a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
directory or using AXENT or a SecureID token). This authenticates
the User to the switch and is protected using Internet Security
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP). The Switch
may be configured to additionally require authentication through
RADIUS with a Group Name and Password. Security options for
IPSec include using an Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) with
Triple-DES, Data Encryption Standard (DES), or “40-bit DES”, and an
Authentication Header (AH) with Message Authentication Code
Secure Hash Algorithm (HMAC-SHA) or HMAC-MD5. When
operating the device in a FIPS 140-1 compliant manner, only the
Triple DES ESP, DES ESP, and HMAC-SHA AH may be enabled.
• PPTP: Requires authentication using the Microsoft Challenge
Handshake Authentication Protocol (MS-CHAP), Challenge
Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP), or Password

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Authentication Protocol (PAP). MS-CHAP can use no encryption, 40-
bit RC4, 128-bit RC4 encryption. When operated in a FIPS 140-1
compliant manner, MS-CHAP is not enabled with RC4 encryption.
• L2TP: Requires authentication using MS-CHAP CHAP, or PAP. MS-
CHAP can use no encryption, 40-bit RC4, 128-bit RC4 encryption.
When operated in a FIPS 140-1 compliant manner, MS-CHAP is not
enabled with RC4 encryption.
• L2F: Requires authentication using CHAP, or PAP.
2.5 Key Management
The switch securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security
parameters such as User passwords. Ephemeral sessions keys are created during the
negotiation of secure tunnels on behalf of Users who have successfully authenticated
themselves to the switch with their user ID and password. These keys are created for
protocols like MS-CHAP and ISAKMP, which securely negotiate key exchange and then
allow encryption services for PPTP, L2TP, and IPSec.
Keys are destroyed when the appropriate tunnel, Security Association (SA), or session is
terminated and are never archived or released from the device. User passwords can be
destroyed by the Crypto Officer or by Users overwriting their own passwords. All
passwords are stored in the LDAP database in an encrypted format, and never released.
They are used only for authentication in key exchange protocols, which protect Critical
Security Parameters (CSPs) according to their protocol. (Crypto Officers should be aware
that PAP transmits password information in the clear and should not be enabled before
deciding local policy. See notes on PAP in the Contivity Extranet Switch Administrator’s
Guide.)
• Session Keys: These are ephemeral encryption keys used by the module for
encrypting packets during IPSec tunneling. These keys are derived during the
setup of the tunnel and used only during a secure tunnel session. The IPSec
tunnel may use either 56-bit DES or TDES for encryption. These keys are
created by setting odd parity and checking for known weak keys. The session
keys are internally derived from the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)/ Internet
Security Association Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP-Oakley). These
protocols are based on Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement. IPSec “Pre-shared
keys” may optionally be used with Diffie-Hellman to negotiate a shared
session key from the concatenated and SHA-1 hashed value of the user ID and
password.
• DES password key: This key is used to encrypt user passwords to be stored in
the module’s internal LDAP database. This key is compiled into the module’s
code and can be zeroized using a floppy to erase the firmware. The floppy
disk unit holds a “format” utility. In order to zeroize the DES key (hard-coded
into the module firmware), the crypto officer must run the format utility

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contained on the floppy disk via the module’s management interface. The
format utility then causes the firmware of the module to be erased
• RSA keys: These RSA public/private key-pairs are used for generating and
verifying digital signatures for authentication of users during IPSec tunneling
sessions. The module’s keys are generated internally by the PKCS#1 standard
using a pseudo-random number generator. The keys are stored in uniquely
named directories in PKCS#5 and PKCS#8 formats, respectively. All RSA
keys can be zeroized by the administrator by entering commands to delete and
zeroize the key directories. The private key is never output from the module
while the module’s public key is output to obtain a certificate from a third
party Certificate Authority (CA).
• RSA Certificates: These public key based certificates are used to authenticate
users for IPSec tunnel sessions. In addition, the module has its own certificate
that it uses to authenticate to users. These X.509 certificates are issued by a
third party CA and stored in the internal LDAP.
2.6 Self-tests
It is important to test the cryptographic components of a security module to insure all
components are functioning correctly. The Contivity Switch includes an array of self-tests
that are run during startup and periodically during operations. The self-tests run at
power-up include a cryptographic known answer tests (KAT) on the FIPS-approved
cryptographic algorithms implemented in both Hardware and Software (DES, 3DES), on
the message digest (SHA-1), and on signatures (RSA with SHA-1). Additional self-tests
performed at startup include software integrity tests using a DES MAC per FIPS 113 and
a continuous random number generator test. Other tests are run periodically or
conditionally such as a software load test for FIPS-approved upgrades using a DES MAC
and the continuous random number generator test. In addition, there are checksum tests
on the flash memory that are updated with flash changes.
If any of these self-test fail the switch will transition into an error state. Within the error
state, all secure data transmission is halted and the switch outputs status information
indicating the failure.

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3 Secure Operation of the Contivity Switch
The Contivity Switch is a versatile machine; it can be run in a Normal Operating Mode or
a FIPS Operating Mode (FIPS mode). In FIPS mode, the switch meets all the Level 2
requirements for FIPS 140-1. To place the module in FIPS mode, click the “FIPS
Enabled” button on the Services Available management screen and restart the module. A
number of configuration settings are recommended when operating the Contivity Switch
in a FIPS 140-1 compliant manner. Other changes are required in order to maintain
compliance with FIPS 140-1 requirements. These include the following:
Recommended
• Change the default administrator password on the switch.
• Disable all management protocols over private non-tunneled interfaces
Required
• Select the “FIPS Enabled” button on the Service Available Management screens
and restart the module.
• Apply the tamper evident labels as described in section 2.3
• Disable cryptographic services that employ non-FIPS approved algorithms.
• For IPSec: When operating the device in a FIPS 140-1 compliant manner,
only the Triple DES ESP, DES ESP, and HMAC-SHA AH may be
enabled. MD5 is not an approved FIPS algorithm.
• For PPTP and L2TP: When operated in a FIPS 140-1 compliant manner,
MS-CHAP and CHAP are not enabled with RC4 encryption.
• For L2P: CHAP must be disabled to operate in a FIPS compliant manner.
• The internal LDAP database must be used in place of an external LDAP
server.
• Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) cannot be used to establish secure connections
• For Routing Information Protocol (RIP) – In FIPS mode, MD5 must be
disabled.
There are several services that are affected by transitioning the module into FIPS
compliant mode. When the module is restarted in FIPS mode, several administrative
services accessing the shell, including the debugging scripts, are disabled. When the
module is in FIPS mode, the administrator is given additional authority to reset the
default administrator’s password and username. The integrated firewall program, by
Checkpoint, and the restore capabilities are disabled during FIPS mode. The FTP demon
is also turned off, preventing any outside intruder from FTPing into the server. In order
to transition the mode out of FIPS mode, the FIPS disable button, on the Services
Available management screen, must be clicked and the module must be restarted.
When transitioning the module from Non-FIPS mode to FIPS mode, the Crypto Officer
should ensure that the module is running only the Nortel supplied, FIPS 140-1 validated
firmware. If there is a concern that the firmware has been modified during operation in
Non-FIPS mode (This might be done by an unauthenticated malicious remote user who

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has the capability to submit shell commands) then the Crypto Officer should reinstall the
Nortel firmware from a trusted media such as the installation CD or the Nortel website.