Runway Airbus A320-214 User manual

Air Accident Investigation Sector
Serious Incident
Final Report 
AAIS Case No: AIFN/0010/2018
Runway Confusion
Takeoff from Wrong Runway
Operator: Air Arabia
Make and Model: Airbus A320-214
Nationality and Registration: The United Arab Emirates, A6-ANV
Place of Occurrence: Sharjah International Airport
State of Occurrence: The United Arab Emirates
Date of Occurrence: 18 September 2018

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 ii
This Investigation was conducted by the Air Accident Investigation Sector of
the United Arab Emirates pursuant to Civil Aviation Law No. 20 of 1991, in
compliance with Air Accident and Incident Investigation Regulation, and in
conformance with the requirements of Annex 13 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation.
This Investigation was conducted independently and without prejudice. The
sole objective of the investigation is to prevent future aircraft accidents and
incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.
The Air Accident Investigation Sector issued this Final Report in accordance
with national and international standards and best practice. Consultation with
applicable stakeholders, and consideration of their comments, took place
prior to the publication of this Report.
The Final Report is publicly available at:
http://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/epublication/pages/investigationReport.aspx
The Air Accident Investigation Sector
General Civil Aviation Authority
The United Arab Emirates
P.O. Box 6558
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates
E-mail: [email protected]
Website: www.gcaa.gov.ae

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 iii
Occurrence Brief
Occurrence File Number : AIFN/0010/2018
Occurrence Category : Serious Incident
Name of the Operator : Air Arabia
Manufacturer : Airbus Industries
Aircraft Model : Airbus A320-214
Engines : Two, CFM56-5B4
Nationality : The United Arab Emirates
Registration : A6-ANV
Manufacturer Serial Number : 5984
Type of Flight : Scheduled Passenger
Flight Number : ABY111
State of Occurrence : The United Arab Emirates
Place of Occurrence : Sharjah International Airport
Date and Time : 18 September 2018, 1225 UTC
Total Crewmembers : 6 (two flight and four cabin crewmembers)
Total Passengers : 42
Injuries to Passengers and Crew : 0
Investigation Process
The Air Accident Investigation Sector of the United Arab Emirates (AAIS) was notified
about the occurrence by a phone call from the operator to the Duty Investigator (DI) Hotline
number [phone].
After the assessment, the AAIS classified the occurrence as a ‘serious incident’.
Accredited representative was assigned by the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour
la Sécurité de l'Aviation civile (BEA) of France as being the State of Design and Manufacture of
the aircraft. The BEA accredited representative was assisted by advisers from Airbus. In addition,
the operator assigned a technical expert to assist the investigator-in-charge.
The scope of this investigation is limited to the relevant flight operations, related aircraft
systems, relevant human factors, and air navigation.
Notes:
1Whenever the following words are mentioned in this Report with the first letter capitalized, it
shall mean:

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 iv
(Aircraft) –the aircraft involved in this serious incident
(Commander) –the commander of the flight
(Copilot) –the copilot of the flight
(Incident) –this investigated serious incident
(Investigation) –the investigation into the circumstances of this serious incident
(Report) –this investigation Final Report.
2Photos and figures used in this Report are taken from different sources and are adjusted from
the original for the sole purpose of improving the clarity of the Report. Modifications to images
used in this Report are limited to cropping, magnification, file compression, or enhancement
of color, brightness, contrast or insertion of text boxes, arrows or lines.
3Unless otherwise mentioned, all times in this Report are UTC. Local time in the United Arab
Emirates is UTC plus 4 hours.

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 v
Abbreviations
A/THR Auto thrust
AAIS The Air Accident Investigation Sector of the United Arab Emirates
ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System
AIFN Accident/Incident File Number
ASR Air safety report
ATC Air traffic control
ATIS Air traffic information system
ATPL Air transport pilot license
CAS Calibrated airspeed
CAR Civil Aviation Regulations
CAVOK Ceiling and visibility okay
CRM Crew resource management
EFIS Electronic flight instrument system
E/WD Engine warning display
FCOM Flight crew operating manual
FCTM Flight crew technique manual
FCU Flight control unit
FDR Flight data recorder
FFS Full flight simulator
FLX/MCT Flexible temperature/maximum continuous thrust
FMA Flight mode annunciator
hPa hectopascal
IOE Initial online experience
LTC Line training captain
MCDU Multi-purpose control and display unit
MPL Multi-crew pilot license
OFP Operational flight plan
PF Pilot flying
PFD Primary flight display
PM Pilot monitoring
QNH Atmospheric pressure (Q) at nautical height
RMP Radio management panel

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 vi
RT Radio telephony
RWY Runway mode in FMA
OMSJ Sharjah International Airport
OOSL Salalah International Airport
SO Second officer
SOP Standard operating procedure
TRE Type rating examiner
TRI Type rating instructor
TOGA Takeoff/go-around
UAE The United Arab Emirates
UTC Universal time coordinated

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 vii
Synopsis
On 18 September 2018, an Air Arabia Airbus A320 Aircraft, registration A6-ANV,
operating scheduled passenger flight ABY111, departed the gate at Sharjah International Airport
(OMSJ), the United Arab Emirates, to Salalah International Airport (OOSA), Sultanate of Oman.
The flight had 48 persons onboard, consisting of two flight crewmembers, four cabin
crewmembers, and 42 passengers. After obtaining air traffic control clearance for takeoff, the
Aircraft took off from runway 12 instead of runway 30.
The Copilot, under training, was the pilot flying (PF) and occupied the right cockpit seat.
The Commander on the flight was a training captain and occupied the left seat.
As part of the Copilot’s training, the Commander had briefed that a rolling takeoff would
be conducted. The responsibility for engine start was the Commander’s. The Copilot taxied the
Aircraft whereas the Commander was on the radio communications.
Tower air traffic control gave clearance for an intersection takeoff from taxiway Bravo 14
for runway 30, which required a left turn for the correct runway. Thereafter, the before takeoff
checklist ‘below the line’items were completed by the flight crew.
Instead of steering the Aircraft left following runway 30 lead-on lines from Bravo 14
intersection, the Copilot steered the Aircraft right for runway 12. The Copilot called out that RWY
was not showing on the flight mode annunciation (FMA) after the thrust levers were moved to the
FLX/MCT detent. As the Aircraft accelerated through 57 knots, the Commander realized that the
Aircraft was on the wrong runway and immediately took over control. His decision to continue the
takeoff was based on his perception that there was insufficient available runway for rejecting the
takeoff. The Commander advanced the thrust levers to TOGA detent and nine seconds after,
changed the Aircraft flap setting from 1+F to flap 2 position. The Aircraft lifted off 20 to 40 meters
beyond the end of runway 12. No. 3 main wheel tire received cuts when it struck one approach
light during the liftoff.
Tower controller did not detect that the Aircraft had turned unto runway 12 and only
noticed when the Aircraft was about eight seconds before liftoff.
The Commander handed over controls to the Copilot and the flight continued
uneventfully to the planned destination.
Safety recommendations in this Report are addressed to the Operator and the air
navigation service provider who developed safety actions for risk mitigation.

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 viii
Contents
Occurrence Brief………………………………………………………………………………………...iii
Investigation Process…………………………………………………………………………………..iii
Abbreviations..…………………………………………………………………………………………….v
Synopsis…………………………………………………………………………………………………..vii
1. Factual Information
1.1 History of the Flight............................................................................................. 1
1.2 Injuries to Persons.............................................................................................. 3
1.3 Damage to Aircraft.............................................................................................. 3
1.4 Other Damage.................................................................................................... 4
1.5 Personnel Information......................................................................................... 4
1.5.1 Flight crew information............................................................................ 4
1.5.2 Air traffic controller.............................................................................. 6
1.6 Aircraft Information.............................................................................................. 6
1.6.1 Aircraft data............................................................................................. 6
1.6.2 Engines data........................................................................................... 7
1.6.3 Flight mode annunciator.......................................................................... 7
1.6.4 Autobrake system............................................................................... 7
1.6.5 Thrust lever detent positions............................................................... 8
1.6.6 Flaps lever position................................................................................. 8
1.6.7 Side stick priority..................................................................................... 8
1.7 Meteorological Information.................................................................................. 9
1.8 Aids to Navigation............................................................................................... 9
1.9 Communications................................................................................................. 9
1.10 Aerodrome Information ......................................................................................10
1.10.1 Runway 12/30 and taxiway signage...................................................10
1.10.2 Air traffic control standby tower..........................................................12
1.11 Flight Recorders ................................................................................................13
1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information .....................................................................13
1.13 Medical and Pathological Information.................................................................13
1.14 Fire………………………………………………………………………………………13
1.15 Survival Aspects ................................................................................................13
1.16 Tests and Research...........................................................................................13

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1.16.1 Rejecting take-off scenarios calculations............................................13
1.16.2 Simulator sessions at the Operator’s flight simulator ..........................14
1.17 Organizational and Management Information.....................................................14
1.17.1 The Operator......................................................................................14
1.17.2 Air navigation services.......................................................................19
1.18 Additional Information ........................................................................................20
1.18.1 Runway awareness and advisory system (RAAS)..............................20
1.18.2 Take-off surveillance and performance analysis.................................20
1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques......................................................21
2. Analysis
2.1 General..............................................................................................................22
2.2 Flight Operations –Taxi and Take-off Execution................................................22
2.3 Flight Crew Performance ...................................................................................23
2.3.1 Copilot’s training progression .................................................................23
2.3.2 Flight crew briefing.................................................................................24
2.3.3 Runway confusion..................................................................................24
2.3.4 Take-off decision....................................................................................25
2.3.5 Crew performance..................................................................................26
2.4 Aerodrome –Taxiway and Runway ...................................................................27
2.5 Air Traffic Control...............................................................................................28
2.5.1 Standby tower........................................................................................28
2.5.2 Controllers communication and movement monitoring...........................28
3. Conclusions
3.1 General..............................................................................................................30
3.2 Findings.............................................................................................................30
3.2.1 Findings relevant to the Aircraft..............................................................30
3.2.2 Findings relevant to the flight crew.........................................................30
3.2.3 Findings relevant to the flight operations................................................30
3.2.4 Findings relevant to air traffic control......................................................31
3.2.5 Findings relevant to Sharjah International Airport...................................32
3.3 Causes ..............................................................................................................32
3.4 Contributing Factors to the Serious Incident.......................................................32
4. Safety Recommendations 33
4.1 General..............................................................................................................33

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4.2 Safety Actions....................................................................................................33
4.2.1 Safety Actions taken by the Aircraft Operator.........................................33
4.2.2 Safety Actions taken by Sharjah Air Navigation Service (SANS)............33
4.3 Final Report Safety Recommendations..............................................................33
4.3.1 Safety Recommendations addressed to the Operator........................33
4.3.2 Safety Recommendations addressed to Sharjah Department of Civil
Aviation……………………………………………………………………...Erro
r! Bookmark not defined.
4.3.3 Safety Recommendations addressed to Sharjah Air Navigation Service
(SANS)...............................................................................................35
Appendix A. ABY111 Takeoff Along Runway 12…………………………………………………….36
Appendix B. Sharjah Airport Chart…………………………………………………………………….37
Appendix C. Airbus Normal Checklist…………………………………………………………………38
List of tables
Table 1. Injuries to persons
Table 2. Crew information
Table 3. Aircraft data
Table 4. Engine data
Table 5. Slats/flaps positions in Airbus A320 (based on FCOM)
List of figures
Figure 1. Damaged No. 3 main wheel tire
Figure 2. Damaged runway 30 light
Figure 3. Location of the damaged runway 30 approach light on the runway end safety
area (RESA)
Figure 4. Airbus A320 dimensions
Figure 5. Airbus A320 PFD indications (RWY green indicates correct runway)
Figure 6. Taxiway Bravo 14 to runway 12/30 taxi lines
Figure 7. Taxiway Bravo 14 runway 12/30 holding point information signage
Figure 8. Standby tower obstructed view of an Airbus A320 aircraft at Bravo 14 holding
point

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1. Factual Information
1.1 History of the Flight
On 18 September 2018, Air Arabia Airbus A320 Aircraft, registration A6-ANV, was
scheduled to operate commercial flight ABY111 from Sharjah International Airport (OMSJ), the
United Arab Emirates, to Salalah International Airport (OOSA), Sultanate of Oman. The flight
occupants were the Commander, who was a training captain, the Copilot, whose designation was
a second officer under training, 4 cabin crewmembers, and 42 passengers.
The flight crew were off duty for 33 hours before the flight. They arrived at the Operator’s
dispatch at approximately 1120 UTC.
The flight preparation went normally, and there was no evidence of rushing the before
start checklist. The take-off mass was well below the maximum.
The flight documents, including the weather report, operational flight plan (OFP), and
departure procedures, were checked and discussed between both flight crewmembers before the
flight.
The Copilot was the pilot flying (PF), and it was her first flight to OOSA. The Commander
stated that he briefed the Copilot that the taxi would be on a single engine with the second engine
start during the taxi. The Commander briefed the Copilot for intersection and rolling takeoff as part
of her training subjects. The responsibility for engine start and air traffic communications was the
Commander’s, whereas the Copilot was responsible for taxiing the Aircraft.
The Aircraft take-off mass was 56.7 tons, center of gravity 27.36%, and the fuel on-board
10,100 kg. The Aircraft configuration for takeoff was flap setting of 1+F using engine thrust setting
at FLX/MCT (Flex temperature of 67 degrees Celsius). The OFP ‘take-off data’ speeds were: 122
knots V1; 127 knots VR; and 129 knots V2. The flight crew entered all relevant flight performance
data, including the runway in use ‘runway 30’, in the Aircraft flight management system (FMS)
through the multipurpose control and display unit (MCDU).
According to the Operator’s procedure, the flight crew were provided with OFP that
included the calculated speeds, but it did not include the accelerate-stop distance required to safely
stop the Aircraft in case of rejected takeoff. The OFP stated in the matrix of data that for a takeoff
on runway30 at Bravo 14 intersection, the take-off distance available would be 3,050 meters, which
was about 1,000 meters shorter that the runway length.
The pushback clearance was given to face east for runway 30. During the pushback from
the parking stand, the left engine (No. 1) was started by the Commander. At 1220:22, the ground
air traffic control (ATC) granted taxi clearance which stated: “taxi runway three-zero, Bravo one-
four, taxi Alpha and Alpha 14 at the holding point contact Tower.”
At 1220:55, the taxi commenced. At 1221:43, during the taxi, the right engine (No. 2) start
was completed by the Commander and the Aircraft reached Bravo 14 runway 12/30 holding point
at 1223.52. The parking brake was set, and the flight crew completed the before takeoff checklist
‘down to the line’.
At 1224:21, the Commander communicated with the Tower stating: “Good afternoon,
Arabia triple-one Bravo fourteen ready for departure.”The Commander read back the Tower
clearance stating: “Clear for takeoff, Bravo fourteen, Runway three zero Arabia triple one. Thank
you.”The crew did not inform the Tower about the planned rolling takeoff. The Copilot then asked
the Commander for completion of the before takeoff checklist ‘below the line’ check items.

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At 1224:35, the flight data recorder (FDR) confirmed that autobrake MAX deceleration rate
was selected, and at 1224:39, the Aircraft parking brake was selected OFF. Shortly after, the
Aircraft started moving towards runway 12/30 on idle thrust.
At 1225:32, the Copilot increasedboth engines' thrust above idle power and started a right
turn from heading 30 degrees towards runway 12. The Commander stated that when the Aircraft
entered runway 12 his sight was directed inside the cockpit completing the items of the before
takeoff checklist. The Copilot advanced the thrust levers while the Aircraft aligned on runway 12.
Tower controller was unaware that the crew had mistakenly turned onto runway 12 instead of
runway 30.
At 1225:40, flight ABQ213, A320 aircraft, completed taxiing and stopped at taxiway Bravo
20, holding point for runway 30, waiting for take-off clearance.
At 1225:51, at 20 knots ground speed, the Copilot applied a nose down sidestick input of
positive 8 degrees and within three seconds had advanced both thrust levers to FLX/MCT position.
The Copilot stated that while the ground speed was increasing, she was busy with the monitoring
the engine power and line-up. She then noticed and called out that the flight mode annunciator
(FMA) was showing NAV instead of RWY.
At 1225:57, 31 knots ground speed, both engines thrust reached 87% N1, and the Aircraft
accelerated from 1 to 4 meters per second.
As per the Commander’s statement, he was busy completing the before takeoff checklist
and did not realize that the Aircraft had turned right onto runway 12 instead of runway 30. He shortly
realized that the Aircraft was on the wrong runway but decided to continue the takeoff believing that
the remaining take-off runway available was insufficient to reject the takeoff. The Commander
stated: “I saw the end of runway coming.”He immediately advanced both engine thrust levers to
the takeoff/go-around (TOGA) position. The FDR data indicated that this action occurred at
1226:01, 57 knots calibrated airspeed (CAS), and 63 knots ground speed, and 730 meters
remaining runway. The Copilot was still applying a nose down sidestick input of 6 degrees.
At 1226:03, 67 knots CAS (72 knots ground speed), both engines attained TOGA engine
thrust, 94.4% N1 speed.
At 1226:09, 106 knots CAS (114 knots ground speed), Tower contacted the flight crew
upon noticing the Aircraft rolling at the wrong runway. There was no response from the flight crew.
At 1226:10, 109 knots CAS (120 knots groundspeed), the Commander moved the slat/flap
levers to Flap 2 position (CONF2), and accordingly the slats and flaps began to extend.
At 1226:12, 122 knots CAS (130 knots ground speed) the Commander initiated a nose-
up sidestick input of 8.3 degrees that subsequently increased to 9.2 degrees. FDR data recorded
the nose landing gear lifted off at this time with a positive increase in Aircraft pitch angle passing
1.9 degrees. Simultaneously, the Copilot was still applying a sidestick nose down of 3 degrees and
maintained at this position.
At 1226:14, 127 knots CAS (140 knots ground speed), the slats and flaps reached the
selected Flap 2 position.
The Aircraft pitch-up angle increased up to 9.1 degrees, and at 1226:16, CAS passing 132
knots, the Aircraft lifted off from runway-end safety area at about 30 meters beyond the end of
runway 12.

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 3
At 1226:17, following liftoff, the Aircraft pitch angle decreased to positive 7.7 degrees.
Nose-up input of 8.3 degrees was applied again on the Commander’s sidestick, and the Aircraft
pitch angle began to increase thereafter.
Unknown to the flight crew, during the liftoff, the No. 3 main gear wheel tire struck and
damaged a runway approach light.
At 1226:23, the Aircraft radio altitude passing 140 ft and 12.3 degrees pitch-up angle,
Tower radioed the flight crew for the second time.
At 1226:26, while the Aircraft was at 260ft above ground level, the Commander responded
to Tower. Thereafter, the flight continued uneventfully with the Copilot as the pilot flying.
In his interview, the Commander stated that after landing at OOSA, the Operator control
center informed the crew about the incident and discussed returning to OMSJ in a scheduled flight.
He also added that he did not observe Aircraft structural damage or marks on the wheels during
the walk-around in OOSA. Accordingly, he decided to return to OMSJ.
The return flight was uneventful, with the Commander as the pilot flying.
1.2 Injuries to Persons
There were no injuries to the flight crew, cabin crew, or the passengers because of the
Incident
Table 1. Injuries to persons
Injuries
Flight
Crew
Cabin
Crew
Other
Crewmembers
Onboard
Passengers
Total
Onboard
Others
Fatal
0
0
0
0
0
0
Serious
0
0
0
0
0
0
Minor
0
0
0
0
0
0
None
2
4
0
42
48
0
Total
2
4
0
42
48
0
1.3 Damage to Aircraft
The Aircraft was intact. The No. 3 main wheel tire on the right main landing gear struck a
runway approach light located at the runway-end safety area, which resulted in cuts to the inboard
sidewall and tread (figure 1). The tire remained inflated during the flight. As per the Commander's
statement, he could not notice any cuts on the tire as the cut was on the lower invisible part of the
tire.
Figure 1. Damaged No. 3 main wheel tire

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 4
1.4 Other Damage
The No. 3 main wheel tire struck the runway 30 approach light. The support post of the
approach light was made of steel and was bolted to the runway surface with a height of 70
centimeters. The base of the light support structure was completely detached, and the light
assembly was broken (figure 2). The damaged approach light was located on the runway end safety
area (RESA) (figure 3).
1.5 Personnel Information
1.5.1 Flight crew information
The Commander was a qualified training captain with 22,184 total flight hours. He held a
valid class 1 medical certificate. He stated that he was fit for duty on the day of the Incident. Besides
his simulator sessions for rejected takeoffs, the Investigation was unable to confirm if the
Commander had performed any A320 rejected takeoff during his career.
The Copilot joined the Operator as a second officer trainee pilot under a designated
training program called initial online experience (IOE). The Copilot held a valid multi-crew pilot
license (MPL), a valid class 1 medical certificate. She stated that she was fit for duty on the day of
the Incident.
The Copilot’s training program was designed to train new joiners on full flight simulators
(FFS) with no turbo-jet engine aircraft experience. As a part of her training, she was required to
complete 100 sectors of line flying during the five stages of the MPL training program.
Figure 2. Damaged runway 30 approach light
Figure 3. Location of the damaged runway 30 approach light on the runway end safety area
(RESA)

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 5
The Copilot was on stage five of the training program after successfully completing stage
four as part of the second officer’s training to remove the restrictions related to proper handling
techniques for:
Taxi techniques
Speed control
Altitude and thrust coordination, instrument scan
Descent profiles and stabilized approaches
Landing techniques (including crosswind)
PM [pilot monitoring] duties
Situational awareness and forward planning.
Accordingly, the Copilot was released to perform the duties of the pilot flying without the
supervision of a cover pilot
1
.
The Commander and the Copilot were together on a four-day pairing and had operated
four uneventful sectors together on 16 and 17 September. The Copilot was the pilot flying for the
two departures from OMSJ, and both were intersection takeoff at Bravo 6 for runway 12. The
Investigation did not find negative observations or comments about the Copilot’s performance by
previous instructors.
Table 2 illustrates the flight crew information.
Table 2. Crew information
Commander
Copilot
Age
51
34
Type of license
ATPL-A
MPL
Valid to
24 Aug 2021
24 June 2026
Rating
IR/MPA/A320
IR/MPA/A320
Total flying time (hours)
22184
159.88
Total on this type (hours)
15536
159.88
Total last 90 days (hours)
220.01
157.97
Total on type last 90 days (hours)
220.01
157.97
Total last 7 days (hours)
21.57
19.19
Total on type last 7 days (hours)
21.57
19.19
Total last 24 hours (hours)
0
0
Last line check
10 September 2018
NA
Medical class
Class I
Class I
Valid to
12 August 2019
2 January 2019
1
The Operator’s operation manual-part A (OM-A) states: Cover Pilot “A pilot serving in anycapacity otherthan the pilot-in-command,
who is onboard the aircraft for the main purpose of replacing the trainee pilot during his inability to operate or succeeding the
commander in the event of his incapacitation.” … “A cover pilot may be any crew qualified to operate from at least one of the pilot
seats of the aircraft type”

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 6
1.5.2 Air traffic controller
The air traffic controller held a valid air traffic control license with ‘aerodrome controller’
rating, and class 1 medical certificate with level-6 English proficiency.
The roster of the air traffic controller showed that his duty on the Incident day was on the
afternoon shift after three days of day-duty. As per the controller’s statement, he was fit for duty
and, was responsible for managing simultaneously both the Ground and Tower frequencies at the
time of the Incident.
The controller stated that he was busy with multi-tasks at the time, granting take-off
clearance to ABY111. He was monitoring Air Blue flight, ABQ213 to ensure that the aircraft was
holding short of runway 30 at Bravo 20 holding point; visually scanning runway 30 approach path
and the departure end of runway 30; and checking the strip markings on the flight progress strips.
The controller was relieved from duty after the Incident, in accordance with Sharjah Air
Navigation Services policy contained in the operations manual of air traffic services.
1.6 Aircraft Information
The Airbus A320 is a medium-range, civil transport aircraft. It is equipped with two high
bypass CFM56-5B4 turbofan engines mounted under the wings. Figure 4 illustrates the Aircraft
dimensions.
1.6.1 Aircraft data
Table 4 provides general Aircraft data at the time of the Incident.
Table 3. Aircraft data
Manufacturer:
Airbus Industries
Model:
A320-214
MSN:
5984
Date of manufacture:
February 2014
Nationality and registration
mark:
The United Arab Emirates, A6-ANV
Certificate of airworthiness
Number:
Issue date:
Valid to:
ARC-AA-ANV-5
31 January 2018
19 February 2019
Certificate of registration
Figure 4. Airbus A320 dimensions

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 7
Number:
Issue date:
Valid to:
UAE-COR-0664
30 March 2015
Open
Date of delivery:
21 February 2014
Last major inspection and date:
A-Check, 12 September 2018
1.6.2 Engines data
Table 5 illustrates the engines data at the time of the Incident.
1.6.3 Flight mode annunciator
The flight mode annunciator (FMA) is divided into five columns and is an integral part of
the cockpit’s primary flight display (PFD). Each column describes the automation mode applied by
the aircraft computers based on the selection made by the flight crew via the flight control unit (FCU)
and the data inserted in the MCDU.
As per the Aircraft’s manufacturer flight crew operating manual (FCOM), during line-up on
the runway for takeoff, the lateral mode column indicates RWY in green color as illustrated in figure
5, provided the following conditions are fulfilled:
The conditions required for SRS mode engagement are:
V2is inserted in the MCDU PERF TAKEOFF page
Slats are extended
The aircraft has been on ground for 30 seconds
The aircraft is receiving a LOC signal and LOC deviation is less than ½ dot;
The aircraft heading is within 20 degrees of the ILS related course; and
The ILS course is identical to the runway heading of the origin airport as selected
for the active flight plan, if any.
1.6.4 Autobrake system
As per the FCOM, the aircraft autobrake system is to:
Reduce the braking distance in case of an aborted takeoff; and
Establish and maintain a selected deceleration rate during landing, thereby
improving passenger comfort and reducing crew workload.
Table 4. Engine data
Left (No.1) engine
Right (No.2) engine
Manufacturer/model
CFM International/ CFM56-5B4
Date installed
6 March 2018
13 February 2014
Time since new (hours)
25,026:47
21,788:38
Cycles since new
9,514
8,183
Time (hours)/cycles since last
inspection (hours)
2,663:26/1,045
1,024:57/406

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The flight crew can select the autobrake deceleration rate of low, medium or maximum by
a pushbutton. As per the standard operating procedure (SOP), the selection of maximum braking
is required for takeoff at all times.
1.6.5 Thrust lever detent positions
The A320 thrust levers can be positioned in six detents along with the console panel. The
six detents divide each of the thrust lever sectors into five segments. The positions are:
REV MAX: Maximum reverse thrust
REV IDLE: idle reverse thrust
FWD IDLE: idle forward thrust
IDLE: Idle thrust for both forward and reverse thrust
CL: Maximum climb thrust
FLX/MCT: Flex takeoff/maximum continuous thrust
TOGA: Maximum takeoff or go-around thrust.
1.6.6 Flaps lever position
There are five flaps lever positions in the A320. Table 6 includes information related to the
flap lever position, slats and flaps actual position, and the phase of flight for each of the flap lever
position:
The positions of the flaps and slats are displayed on the engine warning displays (E/WD)
which are centrally located in the cockpit.
1.6.7 Side stick priority
The two sidesticks on the A320 are not mechanically linked. Therefore, both sidesticks
may be operated independently of each other. When both sticks moving simultaneously, the system
sums up the signals of both pilots algebraically.
A priority pushbutton is provided on each stick to avoid both signals being added by the
system. By pressing this button, a pilot may cancel the inputs of the other pilot. An audio signal will
indicate which sidestick has priority and a red light comes on in front of the pilot whose stick is
deactivated. A green light will come on in front of the pilot who has taken control if the other stick is
not in the neutral position.
Table 5. Slats/flaps positions in Airbus A320
Lever Position
Slats Position
Flaps Position
Phase of Flight
0
0
0
Cruise
1 /1+F
18/18
0/10
Takeoff
2
22
15
Takeoff and Approach
3
22
20
Takeoff, Approach and Landing
Full
27
35
Landing

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 9
1.7 Meteorological Information
Sharjah International Airport meteorological terminal aviation routine weather report
(METAR) for the departure stated:
“Information Papa, Runway 30 in use, Wind 330/11, CAVOK, Temperature 38/
Dew point 21, QNH 1005 hPa NO SIG=”
The METAR of the OMSJ at the time of the Incident stated that runway 30 was in use for
takeoff, and the wind was blowing from direction 330 degrees at 11 knots. There were no clouds;
visibility was more than 10 kilometers, ambient temperature was 38 degrees Celsius, and no
significant change was expected.
At 1225, the time of takeoff for flight ABY111, the sun elevation was 25 degrees above
the horizon at 260 degrees west. Sunset at OMSJ was at 1419, 272 degrees west.
1.8 Aids to Navigation
The Aircraft was equipped with the required navigational equipment. All ground and
onboard navigation equipment were serviceable.
1.9 Communications
The communication between the flight crew and the air traffic control was audible and
clear. The timings recorded by the air traffic communication audio recordings were similar to the
Aircraft FDR timings.
At the time of the Incident, Tower and Ground control positions were managed by one
controller. There were two aircraft each on the Tower and Ground frequency. The following was
the communication between the flights and the OMSJ air traffic controller:
At 1216:41, the ground gave clearance for pushback stating “Arabia triple-one push
and start approved from stand six, face to the east.” The Commander read back the
Ground instructions correctly.
At 1220:13, the Commander requested ground “Arabia triple one requesting taxi
Bravo fourteen, thank you.”
At 1220:15, the Ground gave ABY111 clearance for taxi “Arabia triple-one runway
three zero bravo one four taxi Alpha and Alpha one four at holding point contact
Tower.”
At 1220:22 the Commander replied stating “Alpha Alpha one four at the holding point
contact Tower Arabia triple one.”
At 1224:21, the Commander communicated with the Tower stating “Good afternoon
Arabia triple one Bravo fourteen ready for departure.”
At 1224:24, Tower gave clearance for takeoff stating “Arabia triple one Sharjah
Tower runway three zero, Bravo one four the wind three two zero at one zero,
cleared for takeoff.”
At 1224:30, the Commander read back Tower clearance stating “Clear for takeoff
Bravo fourteen Runway three zero Arabia triple one thank you.”
Ae 1224:36, Tower communicated with Air Blue ABQ213 stating “Air Blue two one
three monitor Tower hold short of runway three zero.”

Final Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022 10
At 1224:40, ABQ213 confirmed to Tower that were holding short of runway 30.
At 1226:02,another flight, ABY189, contacted Tower stating “Just to confirm Arabia
one-eight-nine ahhh we can Alpha one four Bravo one four[?]”
At 1226:09, Tower tried to contact ABY111 stating “Arabia triple one Tower.”
At 1226:12, ABY189, radioed Tower stating “Yeah just to conform we have aircraft
runway one two just to confirm we continue to Bravo one four [?]”
At 1226:19, Tower instructed ABY189 to standby.
At 1226:23, Tower communicated with ABY111 stating “Arabia triple one Sharjah
Tower.”
At 1226:27, the Commander replied to Tower stating “Arabia triple one go ahead
sir.”
At 1226:29, Tower stated to ABY111 “Yes sir triple one runway three zero is in use
sir.”
At 1226:33, the Commander responded to Tower stating “Arabia triple one we
recognize that now.”
At 1226:35, Tower stated to ABY111 “Say again.”
At 1226:37, the Commander replied to Tower stating “We recognize that now sir
[uh] we take off [unintelligible] runway. Now we level off at runway heading two
thousand.”
At 1227:30, Tower instructed ABY111 to contact Dubai Departure.
The aeronautical information publications (AIP) of the United Arab Emirates required
departures from OMSJ to contact Dubai Departure as soon as possible after passing 500 ft with
initial climb restricted to 2,000 ft until further instructions are received from Dubai Departure.
1.10 Aerodrome Information
1.10.1 Runway 12/30 and taxiway signage
Sharjah International Airport has one concrete runway 12/30 with a length of 4060 meters
long, 60 meters wide, and 7.5 meters hard surface shoulder on each side. Runway 12 and runway
30 has a displaced threshold of 300 meters. Appendix B of this Report illustrates Sharjah Airport
Chart.
The slope of runway 12 over the last 1,500 meters is positive 0.6 percent. The runways
center lighting consists of bi-directional, 15 meters spacing with the first 3,130 meters white, next
600 meters alternate white/red, and the last 330 m red. At the end of runways 12 and 30, there is
a runway-end safety area (RESA) of 240 meters by 60 meters consisting of asphalt material for the
first 124 meters and road base material for the remainder. The landing approach lights fitted on the
RESA are spaced 30 meters apart, with the last light 30 meters before the start of the runway. The
runways have no arresting system installed.
Figure 7 illustrates that when runway 30 is used for intersection takeoff at Bravo 14, a left
turn is required, with a take-off distance available of 3052 meters. The taxiway centerline that leads
to runway 12 and runway 30 is marked with a continuous 150 millimeter wide yellow line in
accordance with the requirements of the Civil Aviation Regulations CAR Part IX - Aerodromes. In
case a right turn is made, the aircraft will be on runway 12 with the runway available of 1006 meters,